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INTRODUCTION
Recently the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) has rendered
a number of significant decisions' concerning certain fundamental em-
ployee rights under section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA).2 This article is a brief distillation of these decisions. The
essence .thus distilled reflects major doctrinal trends. It suggests a
renewed recognition by the NLRB of basic employee rights, particularly
those of free choice and speech in labor disputes. It further indicates a
pronounced emphasis by the NLRB both upon prompt realization of
those rights and meaningful protection against their infringement.
I. EFFECTUATING EMPLOYEE FREE CHOICE
Section 7 guarantees to employees the rights to organize, join and
bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing. The
statutory declaration of these rights of free choice is made broadly and
essentially without limitation. The question has long plagued the
Board whether qualifications should be placed on such rights, for con-
stitutional or statutory reasons, where the employees' free choice of
representative may fail to meet some ideal standard. For example, may
the employees choose and may the Board certify as bargaining repre-
sentative a union that engages in a pattern or practice of racial dis-
crimination, or a union that lies to obtain the employees' votes? The
* Associate Professor of Law, The Ohio State University College of Law.
1. Portions of this article had their origins in Modjeska. The NLRB 1977: Significant
Decisions of the Board and General Counsel, 103 MIDwesT LAB, L. ComF. 2.01 (Ohio Legal
Center Institute 1977).
2. Section 7 provides that:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organi-
zations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and
to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such
activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring
membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in sec-
tion 8(a)(3).
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970).
3. Under § 9 of the Act the Board administers representation determination procedures.
Section 9(a) provides that a representative selected by the majority of employees in an appropriate
bargaining unit shall be the exclusive representative of all unit employees. Section 9(b) authorizes
the Board to determine the appropriate unit. Section 9(c) sets forth the procedure for ascertaining
whether a majority of employees desire union representation. Under § 9(c), if a union files an
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Board dealt with such issues in several major decisions during 1977, and
as shown below the decisions reflect a current Board swing in the direc-
tion of unrestricted employee free choice.
A. The Discriminatory Union
In the trilogy of Handy Andy, Inc.,4 Bell & Howell Co.,5 and Murcel
Manufacturing Corp.,6 the Board held that it was neither required by
the Constitution nor permitted by the NLRA to withhold certifications
or bargaining orders from labor unions that practice or engage in racial
or other invidious discrimination.7 The Board announced that such
issues will not be resolved in pre-certification or pre-bargaining order
proceedings but rather in section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) unfair labor prac-
tice proceedings' under the duty of fair representation doctrine of
Miranda Fuel Co.9 In so holding, the Board overruled its 1974 deci-
sion in Bekins Moving & Storage Co.t0 and also rejected the principles
election petition with the Board, alleging that a substantial numb-r of employees wishes to be
represented for collective bargaining and that the employer declines to recognize the union, the
Board investigates to determine whether a question concerning representation exists. If the Board
finds that a question concerning representation exists it directs a secret ballot election and certifies
the election results. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a)-(c) (1970). NLRB v. Metropolitan Life Ins, Co., 380 U.S.
438 (1965); Ray Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96 (1954); NLRB v. A. J. Tower Co., 329 U.S. 324,
330-31 (1946); Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 146, 152-53 (1941); AFL v, NLRB,
308 U.S. 401, 405-06 (1940). Section 8(a)(5) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to
refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5)
(1970). Linden Lumber Div., Summer & Co. v. NLRB, 419 U.S. 301 (1974); NLRB v. Gissel Pack-
ing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
4. 228 N.L.R.B. No. 59, 94 L.R.R.M. 1354 (1977) (Chairman Murphy with Members Fanning
and Penello for the majority, Member Walther concurring, and Member Jenkins dissenting),
5. 230 N.L.R.B. No. 57, 95 L.R.R.M. 1333 (1977) (Chairman Fanning with Members Murphy
and Penello for the majority, Member Walther concurring, and Member Jenkins dissenting),
6. 231 N.L.R.B. No. 80, [1977-78] LAD. L. REP. (CCH) 18,493 (NLRB 1977) (Chairman
Fanning with Members Murphy and Penello for the majority, Members Jenkins and Walther
concurring).
7. In Handy Andy the Board held that a union's alleged discriminatory practices did not
preclude certification of the union after a decertification election pracceding. Accord, Trumbull
Asphalt Co., Inc., 230 N.L.R.B. No. 100, 96 L.R.R.M. 1100 (1977). In Bell & Howell the Board
held that a union's alleged discriminatory practices did not preclude issuance of a bargaining order
in a § 8(a)(5) proceeding testing an underlying certification, Accord, FDI, Inc., 231 N.L.R.B,
No. 168, 96 L.R.R.M. 1628 (1977). In Murcel Mfg. the Board held that a union's alleged dis-
criminatory practices did not preclude issuance of a bargaining order based on authorization cards.
Thereafter in Local 393 Plumbers, 232 N.L.R.B. No. 83, 97 LR.R.M. 1153 (1977) the Board
applied Handy Andy to a jurisdictional dispute and refused to withhold § 10(k) certification
because of alleged union discriminatory practices.
8. Section 8(b)(1)(A) makes it an unfair labor practice for a union "to restrain or coerce . . .
employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7. . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A)
(1970). E.g., NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175 (1967); NLRB v. Drivers Local
639, 362 U.S. 264 (1967). Section 8(b)(2) makes it an unfair labor practice for a union "to cause
or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an emploee in violation of subsection
(a)(3) [discrimination to encourage or discourage union membership] .. " 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2)
(1970). Eg., NLRB v. News Syndicate Co., 365 U.S. 695 (1961); Local 357, Int'l Bhd. of
Teamsters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667 (1961).
9. 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), enforcement denied, 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963).
10. 211 N.L.R.B. 138 (1974). The Board there stated:
Were we, as an arm of the Federal Government, to confer the benefits of a certification
upon a labor organization which is shown to be engaging in a pattern and practice of
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of NLRB v. Mansion House Center Management Corp.," in which the
Eighth Circuit held that the Board was precluded by the fifth amend-
ment from issuing a bargaining order in favor of a union that practices
racial discrimination.' 2  The Board announced in Handy Andy, "The
duty of fair representation has become the touchstone of the Board's
concern with invidious discrimination by unions."
13
Detailed analysis of Handy Andy is beyond the scope of this arti-
cle. 14  A few passing comments may be in order, however, concerning
the Board's restrictive views on the constitutional implications of its
authority. The due process clause of the fifth amendment proscribes
the federal government's practice of or participation in invidious dis-
crimination.15 In Green v. Connally, 6 for example, the court held that
the Internal Revenue Code must be construed to deny federal tax
exemptions to racially discriminatory private schools, and to deny
deductions to persons making gifts to such schools. The three-judge
court, in an opinion by Circuit Judge Leventhal, held that:
The Code must be construed and applied in consonance with the
Federal public policy against support for racial segregation of schools,
public or private.
Clearly the Federal Government could not under the Consti-
tution give direct financial aid to schools practicing racial discrimination.
But tax exemptions and deductions certainly constitute a Federal Gov-
ernment benefit and support. While that support is indirect, and is in the
nature of a matching grant rather than an unconditional grant, it would
invidious discrimination, the power of the Federal Government would surely appear to
be sanctioning, and indeed furthering, the continued practice of such discrimination,
thereby running afoul of the due process clause of the fifth amendment.
Id. at 138-39. For applications of the Bekins analysis see, e.g., Vari-Tronies Co., Inc., 230
N.L.R1B. No. 171, 95 L.R.R.M. 1519 (1977);.Williams Enterprises. Inc., 212 N.L.R.B. 880 (1974);
Grants Furniture Plaza, Inc. 213 N.L.R.B. 410 (1974).
11. 473 F.2d 471 (8th Cir. 1973). The court there stated: "Federal complicity through
recognition of a discriminating union serves not only to condone the discrimination, but in effect
legitimizes and perpetuates such invidious practices. Certainly such a degree of federal partici-
pation in the maintenance of racially discriminatory practices violates basic constitutional
tenets." Id. at 477.
12. See generally Meltzer, The National Labor Relations Act and Racial Discrimination:
The More Remedies, the Better? 42 U. CHi. L. REv. 1 (1974); Comment, 123 U. PA. L Rev.
158 (1974).
13. 94 L.R.R.M. at 1362.
14. For a fuller analysis of Handy Andy, see 1976-77 Annual Survey of Labor Relations and
Employment Discrimination Law, 18 B.C. IND. & Cost. L. REv. 1045, 1103-17 (1977).
15. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). See also Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948)
and Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961), involving the analogous"state action"
concept under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. In Burton the Court
pointed out that private conduct which abridges individual rights does "%iolence' to the equal
protection clause if "to some significant extent the State in any of its manifestations has been
found to have become involved in it." Id. at 722. See generally L. TRiNE, Atealc., Co.;STI-
TTMIONAL LAW 1147-74 (1978).
16. 230 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C. 1971), qa'd, 404 U.S. 997 (1971). See McGlottenv. Connally.
338 F. Supp. 448 (D.D.C. 1972).
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be difficult indeed to establish that such support can be provided consis-
tently with the Constitution.
7
The grant of representative status to a union, whether by section 9
certification or section 8(a)(5) bargaining order, carries powers and
responsibilities of major import. 8 The Board plays a major role in the
process of awarding and enforcing that bargaining representative
status.' 9 There would accordingly seem to be substantial merit to the
argument that to grant representative status to a union that engages in
a pattern or practice of invidious discrimination places the Board in the
position of "sanctioning, and indeed furthering, the continued practice
of such discrimination, thereby running afoul of the due process clause
of the fifth amendment. 20  For it would seem that if the Board grants
representative status to a union that practices discrimination, it may be
found to have placed "its power . . . and prestige" behind the dis-
crimination and to have granted "federal Government benefit and
17. 330 F. Supp. at 1163-65 (D.D.C. 1971). See Reitman v. Mulkey. 387 U.S. 369 (1967);
Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157 (1961) (separate opinion of Justice Douglas); Gautreaux v.
Romney, 448 F.2d 731 (7th Cir. 1971); Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 323 F,2d 959
(4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 938 (1964).
18. The collective bargaining representative receives not only wide responsibility but also
authority to meet that responsibility. See Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman. 345 US. 330, 339 (1953),
A statutory bargaining representative under the NLRA exercises a grant of powers "comparable
to those possessed by a legislative body .. " Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 323 U.S.
192, 202 (1944). This point was made by Mr. Chief Justice Stone in a discussion of statutory bar-
gaining representatives under the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-63 (1970), but is equally
true of statutory bargaining representatives under the NLRA: "Congress has seen fit to clothe
the bargaining representative with powers comparable to those posessed by a legislative body
both to create and restrict the rights of those whom it represents. . . ." 322 U.S. at 202 (1944),
Accord. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 182 (1967); Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B, 181, 184-85
(1962). The national labor policies of majority rule and union exclusivity extinguish the individual
employee's power to control his own relations with the employer and give the majority represen-
tative the power to act for the benefit of all employees. See NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388
U.S. 175 (1967), in which the Court stated:
National labor policy has been built on the premise that by pooling their economic
strength and acting through a labor organization freely chosen by the majority, the em-
ployees of an appropriate unit have the most effective means of bargaining for improve-
ments in wages, hours, and working conditions. The policy therefore extinguishes the
individual employee's power to order his own relations with his employer and creates a
power vested in the chosen representative to act in the interests of all employees ...
Thus only the union may contract the employee's terms and conditions of employment,
and provisions for processing his grievances; the union may even bargain away his right
to . . . refuse to cross a lawful picket line. The employee may disagree with many of
the union decisions but is bound by them.
Id. at 180. See Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Org., 420 U.S. 50
(1975). E.g., NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962); Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB,
379 U.S. 203 (1964) (proscriptions against unilateral changes in wages, hours, and other terms
and conditions of employment).
19. The Board has the power to create representative status, through either a representation
or an unfair labor practice case. The Board can alter the representative status (AC petition),
clarify it (UC petition), and terminate it (RD petition or sustaining an employers withdrawal of
recognition). See generally R. GORMAN, LABOR LAW: UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIvt BAR-
GAINING 40-50, 108-16, 726-28 (1976). The Board can also enforce the continued existence of
that status through remedial orders under § 8(a)(5) and 8(b)(3).
20. Bekins Moving & Storage Co.. 211 N.L.R.B. 138, 139 (1974).
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support" to such discrimination.2 ' Disqualification of a union that
practices invidious discrimination may be a severe sanction, and one
that intrudes upon the exercise by employees of important section 7
rights, but the short answer may be the constitutional mandate against
the federal government's practice of or participation in invidious dis-
crimination.22 Indeed, the Board's rejection in Handy Andy of a consti-
tutional limitation on its certification authority 3 appears patently
inconsistent with its indication that it will continue to deny the protec-
tions of its contract bar rules under its Pioneer Bus Co. doctrine, 4 and
to revoke certifications under its Hughes Tool Co. doctrine,25 in appro-
priate cases of discrimination. 26  Both Pioneer Bus and-Hughes Tool
were squarely predicated upon constitutional limitations upon the
27Board's power and processes.
The Board will undoubtedly continue for some time to wrestle
with the difficult and sensitive question of its role in the areas of racial
and other invidious discrimination.28 It may be contended that the
21. Compare the more remote and tangential governmental involvement in Moose Lodge
No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
22. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), would indicate that before a union could be
denied a certification or bargaining order because of discrimination, discriminatory purpose or
motive must be established.
23. Apart from the question of constitutional limitations, NAACP v. FPC, 425 U.S. 662
(1976), seems to undercut the Board's position that it lacks statutory authority to withhold a
certification or bargaining order from a union that practices invidious discrimination. In that
case, the Court, confining itself to the statutory question and not reaching the constitutional
issues, held that the FPC, under its statute, had the authority to consider a regulatee's discrimina-
tory practices where such practices were germane to the FPC's task of setting rates. The Court
also indicated that the FPC had statutory authority to adopt regulations concerning discriminatory
practices because such practices would bear upon whether a regulate should be granted or
allowed to retain a license or permit. If discriminatory practices are relevant to the FPC's
licensing of a regulatee, the same practices by a "regulated" union would clearly seem relevant
to the Board's statutory role of certifying representatives and insuring fair representation by that
representative.
24. Pioneer Bus Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 54, 55 (1962).
25. Metal Workers Local I (Hughes Tool Co.), 147 N.L.R.B. 1573 (1964); Hughes Tool
Co., 104 N.L.R.B. 318, 319-24 (1953).
26. The Board also stated that it would continue to police election propaganda involving
improper racial appeals. Eg., Coca-Cola Bottling Co. Consol., 232 N.L.R.B. No. 114, 96
L.R.R.M. 1289 (1977), and cases there cited.
27. In Pioneer Bus, in which the Board held that contracts that discriminate along racial
lines will not bar an election, the Board stated: "Consistent with clear court decisions in other
contexts which condemn governmental sanctioning of racially separate groupings as inherently
discriminatory, the Board will not permit its contract-bar rules to be utilized to shield contracts
such as those here involved from the challenge of otherwise appropriate election petitions."
Pioneer Bus Co., 140 N.L.R.B. at 55 (1962). And in Hughes Tool, where the Board held that a
certification should be rescinded because the unions executed and administered contracts and
union membership policies along racial lines, the Board stated:
mhe separate opinion disregards certain constitutional limitations upon the Board's
powers. . . . Specifically, we hold that the Board cannot validly render aid under Sec-
tion 9 of the Act to a labor organization which discriminates racially when acting as a
statutory bargaining representative. Cf. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1; Hurd v. Hodge,
334 U.S. 24; Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497.
Hughes Tool Co., 147 N.L.R.B. at 1577-78 (1964).
28. See generally W. GOULD, BLAcK WORKERs IN WHrra UNIONS 163-206 (1977).
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question has a simple and direct answer, namely, that the Board's only
concern under the NLRA is with union-related discrimination.29  This
contention would find support in the text, structure and purpose of the
Act itself, the absence in the legislative history of any congressional
indication militating in favor of the Board's involvement, the Board's
lack of expertise in the area, and the existence of Title VII and a host
of other laws squarely dealing with employment discrimination. Em-
porium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Organization'"t
might be read as squarely holding that the Board is to leave racial and
other non-union related discrimination to other agencies, such as the
EEOC, that possess specific charters in those areas.
The better argument, however, would seem to be that, although the
Board has been inconsistent and groping in what it has done, it has
nevertheless in fact been involved in these areas of invidious discrimi-
nation since the early days of the Act. As noted zbove,31 the Board has
responded to such discrimination by revoking certifications, refusing to
apply its contract-bar doctrine, policing election propaganda, and
applying Miranda Fuel protections. Neither Congress nor the judiciary
has disapproved of these Board doctrines. Emporium may actually
mean that the Board is permitted to enter the area of racial and other
invidious employment discrimination but that it must do so cautiously.
Indeed, the Supreme Court expressly noted in Emporium that it did
"4not call into question either the capacity or the propriety of the Board's
sensitivity to questions of discrimination. 32 Viewed against this back-
ground, Handy Andy may not in any real way signify Board withdrawal
from the area of racial and other invidious discrimination, but may sim-
ply signify the Board's funneling of such problems away from the essen-
tially nonadversary representation proceedings into the adversary un-
fair labor practice arena.
As noted above,33 the Board now regards the Miranda Fuel doc-
29. Discrimination based upon union membership or nonpayment of union fines are such
examples. See Painters Local 1066 (W.J. Siebenoller, Jr., Paint Co.), 205 N.L.R.B. 651, 652 53.
n.4 (1973); IUOE Local 18 (Ohio Contractors Ass'n & William F. Murphy), 204 N.L.R.B. 681
(1973), remanded, 496 F.2d 1308 (6th Cir. 1974), dec. on remand, 22(1 N.L.R.B. 147 (1975),
30. 420 U.S. 50 (1975). The Court there held, relying heavily upon the principle of the
exclusivity of the bargaining representative, that minority emplo)ee protests against the em-
ployer's allegedly discriminatory practices were not necessarily protected by § 7, even if the
activity was arguably protected by Title VII. But see Armco Steel Corp., 232 NL.R.B, No, 110,
96 L.R.R.M. 1325 (1977). See generally, Cantor, Dissident Worker Action, After The Emporium,
29 RUTGERs L. REV. 35 (1975); Schatzki, Majority Rule, Exclusive Representation, and the
Interests of Individual Workers: Should Exclusivity Be Abolished? 123 U. PA, L. Rtv, 897
(1975); Lopatka, Protection Under the National Labor Relations Act and Title VII of The Civil
Rights Act For Employees Who Protest Discrimination in Private Employment, 50 N.Y.U.L,
REv. 1179 (1975).
31. See notes 24-26 and accompanying text supra.
32. 420 U.S. at 71-72 n.25. The Court also noted the Board's positions in iltughes Tool
Co. and Miranda Fuel Co.
33. See text accompanying note 13 supra.
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trine, under which breach of the duty of fair representation is an unfair
labor practice, as the "touchstone" of the Board's dealing with invidious
discrimination by unions. There is a risk in this new approach by the
Board. Although Miranda Fuel has been Board policy since 1962, it
is by no means judicially established and remains in many ways a very
uncertain doctrine. The doctrine has so far been endorsed by only a
few courts of appeals and has not yet been approved by the Supreme
Court. 4 If Miranda Fuel remains viable, the Board's new approach
may ultimately prove to be a realistic and practicable way of dealing
with invidious discrimination. On the other hand, if the Miranda Fuel
doctrine is short-lived the Board may well have painted itself into a
comer..
In Handy Andy the Board gives a nod to the "national labor
policy [that] embodies the principles of nondiscrimination as a matter
of highest priority"35 but then opts for the prompt recognition of em-
ployees' section 7 right "to bargain collectively through representatives
of their own choosing." The Board has thereby put the primary and
maximum focus upon the importance of employee free choice, and gives
employees the essentially unrestricted right to select good or bad
unions.36
B. The Lying Union
The Board's focus upon employee free choice is evident in another
major reversal. In Shopping Kart Food Market, Inc.,37 the Board over-
ruled its long-standing Hollywood Ceramics Co.3 " rule and held that the
Board would no longer set aside representation elections because of
misleading campaign statements. Under Hollywood Ceramics the
Board viewed its function as one of limited intervention in elections,
34. Modjeska, The Uncertain Miranda Fuel Doctrine, 38 Oniio ST. Li. 807 (1978). See
generally Summers, The Individual Employee's Rights Under the Collective Agreement: Wlhaat
Constitutes Fair Representation, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 251 (1977); Clark, The Duty of Fair Represen-
tation: A Theoretical Structure, 51 TEXAS L. REV. 1119 (1973).
35. Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Organization, 420 U.S. 50,
66 (1975).
36. In Alto Plastics Mfg. Corp., 136 N.L.R.B. 850 (1962). the Board rejected the contention
that it should withhold its election processes from an allegedly corrupt union. The Board indi-
cated that if the union won the election and later failed to fulfill its statutory representative
obligations the Board would entertain a motion to revoke the certification. But see St. Louis
Labor Health Institute, 230 N.L.R.B. No. 1, 95 L.R.R.M. 1347 (1977).
37. 228 N.L.R.B. No. 190, 94 L.R.R.M. 1705 (1977) (Members Penello and Walther for the
majority, Chairman Murphy concurring, and Members Fanning and Jenkins dissenting in part).
Because Member Walther has now left the Board Shopping Kart may well be a short-lived
precedent.
38. 140 N.L.R.B. 221 (1962). The progenitor of Hollyi-wood CeranticsA-as Gummed Products
Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1092 (1955). See generally Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in
Representation Elections Under the National Labor Relations Act, 78 HARv. L REV. 38 (1964);
Christensen, Free Speech, Propaganda and the National Labor Relations Act, 38 N.Y.U.L REV.
243 (1963).
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seeking to maintain laboratory conditions and striking a balance
between employees' rights to an untrammeled choice and the parties'
rights to wage a free and vigorous campaign. The Board had devised
the following formula in Hollywood Ceramics for striking this balance:
We believe that an election should be set aside only where there has
been a misrepresentation or other similar campaign trickery, which in-
volves a substantial departure from the truth, at a time which prevents the
other party or parties from making an effective reply, so that the misrep-
resentation, whether deliberate or not, may reasonably be expected to
have a significant impact on the election.39
In Shopping Kart, the Board found that experience under the Holy-
wood Ceramics rule had been unsatisfactory. The rule had tended to
impede the attainment of employee free choice and had produced a host
of ill effects. Included among these ill effects were extensive analysis of
campaign literature, curtailment of free speech, differing application
of the rule between the Board and the courts, increased litigation, and
a resultant decrease in the finality of election results. The Board noted
that much of the difficulty lay in the vagueness and flexibility of the
Hollywood Ceramics rule, as well as in a variety of dubious assumptions
concerning the needs of employees for Board protection against cam-
paign misrepresentation. 40  The Board stated that it would no longer
view employees as "naive and unworldly [individuals] whose decision
on as critical an issue as union representation is easily altered by the
self-serving campaign claims of the parties," but rather that it would now
view employees as "mature individuals who are capable of recognizing
campaign propaganda for what it is and discounting it."'41 The Board
concluded that while the Act's purposes would b. best served by the
demise of the Hollywood Ceramics rule, the Board would continue to
intervene where a party engages in such deceptive campaign practices
as improperly involving the Board and its processes, or using forged
42documents. Thus, the Board said that although it would not set an
election aside because of the substance of a representation, it would
39. 140 N.L.R.B. at 224.
40. The Board recognized the validity of such critical analyses as Bok, The Regulation of
Campaign Tactics In Representation Elections' Under the National Labor Relatlons Act, 78
HARV. L. REV. 38 (1964), and Getman & Goldberg. The Behavioral Assumptions Underlving
NLRB Regulation of Campaign Misrepresentations: An Empirical E'aluation, 28 STAN. 1., RLv.
263 (1976). The full study by Professors Getman, Goldberg and Herman of the effect of pre-
election campaigns upon employee predispositions in voting was published in J. OHlMAN, S.
GOLDBERG & J. HERMAN, UNION REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS: LAw AND RLALITY (1976), By
any analysis the book is a major contribution to the law.
41. 94 L.R.R.M. at 1707.
42. E.g., Formco, Inc., 233 N.L.R.B. No. 5,96 L.R.R.M. 1392(1977); Silco Inc., 231 NL.RB,
No. 23, 95 L.R.R.M. 1516 (1977), and cases there cited; J. Ray NMcDermott & Co,, Inc,, 215
N.L.R.B. 570 (1974); Cascade Corp., 205 N.L.R.B. 638 n.2 (1973); Sylvania Electric Products,
Inc., 119 N.L.R.B. 824, 827-830 (1957); United Aircraft Corp., 103 N L.R.B. 102 (1953), But see
Fabricut, Inc., 233 N.L.R.B. No. 173, 97 L.R.R.M. 1004 (1977).
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set an election aside where the representation is made in a deceptive
manner. The Board explained:
The essential difference lies in the fact that while employees are able to
evaluate mere propaganda claims, there is simply no way any person
could recognize a forged document "for what it is" from its face since, by
definition, it has been altered to appear to be that which it is not.
43
The Board also said that it would continue to review the propriety of other
campaign conduct, apart from misrepresentations, that interferes with
employee free choice.
A major theme behind the rhetoric of Shopping Karl is again the
Board's recognition of employees' section 7 rights to bargain collec-
tively through representatives of their choosing, be it a good or bad or
even a lying union. To be sure, the decision has broader implications in
its deregulation of employer pre-election speech. And one may con-
clude that the essence of Shopping Kart is the proposition that em-
ployees ignore, can evaluate, and/or are not affected by campaign repre-
sentations. The fact remains that the union in Shopping Karl made a
substantial misrepresentation" and that the Board found the employees
could evaluate the statement for what it was. What it was, put simply,
was a lie, and what the decision says, put equally simply, is that if
employees want a lying union they can have one. So it goes.
4
5
II. EFFECTUATING UNASCERTAINABLE EMPLOYEE FREE CHOICE
Recent decisions of the General Counsel further reflect the
NLRB's renewed attempts to fashion more effective remedies both to
redress and to deter employer unfair labor practices which interfere
with the exercise of free choice by employees.46 Nowhere is the trend
more evident than in the General Counsers determination to seek a
bargaining order as a remedy for employer unfair labor practices even
when the union has never attained majority status.47 The emphasis,
43. 94 L.R.R.M. at 1708.
44. The night before the election, the union told employees that the employer's profits during
the preceding year were $500,000; the evidence established that the profits had been about
S50,000. Id. at 1705.
45. Eg., Cormier Hosiery Mills, Inc. and Central New Hampshire Dye. Inc., 230 N.L.R.B.
No. 185, 95 L.R.R.M. 1461 (1977), in which the Board applied Shopping Kart in refusing to set
aside an election based upon the union's misrepresentation that the employer had engaged in
intercorporate manipulations by making a two million dollar loan that prevented employees from
sharing equitably in the employer's profits.
46. See generally, Irving, Remedies and Compliance- Putting more Teeth Into The Act
[1977] SW. LEGAL FOUNDATION, LABOR LASw DEVELOPIENTs 1977, 349. The Board has uide
remedial discretion and authority under the Act, subject to the limitation that its orders may not
be punitive. Local 60, United Bhd. of Carpenters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 651 (1961); Phelps Dodge
Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941).
47. Section 10(b) of the Act (29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1970)) gives the Board or its agent broad
discretionary authority concerning the issuance of unfair labor practice complaints NLRB %.
Indiana & Michigan Elec. Co., 318 U.S. 9, 18 (1943). Section 3(d) (29 U.S.C. § 153(d) (1970))
confers this power upon the General Counsel of the Board, and provides that he shall have
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as in the cases discussed previously, is upon the maximum effectuation
of employee free choice. However, these situations differ: When the
employer's unfair labor practices render the actual choice of the em-
ployees unascertainable, that choice is presumed.
Thus, in two cases the General Counsel authorized issuance of
complaints alleging that a bargaining order was an appropriate remedy
for serious unfair labor practices in violation of sections 8(a)(1) and
(3) despite the fact that the unions had failed to obtain authorization
cards from a majority of the employees. 48  In one of the cases, 49 upon
learning of the union's organizational campaign, the employer inter-
rogated employees, gave employees the impression of being under sur-
veillance, made threats of a plant shutdown, promised benefits, and
advised employees of the futility of joining the union. When the
union demanded recognition, the employer told the employees that its
largest contractor would cancel its contract if the plant were union-
ized; shortly thereafter the employer laid off in inverse seniority a
large number of employees, including the leading union adherents.
The union had obtained authorization cards from a majority of the em-
ployees. The General Counsel therefore authorized a complaint on the
ground that the employer had violated section 8(a)(5) of the Act by
refusing to bargain with the majority representative. The investigation
of the case, however, had also revealed that the authenticity of some
cards was questionable. If the cards were not .uthenticated at the
hearing it would not be possible to establish that the union had ever
attained a majority. The General Counsel nevertheless authorized the
complaint on the alternative ground that a bargaining order was still
an appropriate remedy in view of the seriousness of the employer's
unfair labor practices.
In the second case,50 the employer unlawfully discharged seven
employees the day after some of the employees began to sign union au-
thorization cards. Three days later the employer refused the union's
request for recognition, and the employees struck and joined a picket
line along with the discharged employees. A week later the employer
unlawfully discharged a clerical employee who had spoken with the
pickets. The employer also threatened to discharge additional em-
"final authority, on behalf of the Board, in respect of the investigation of charges and issuance of
complaints under section 10, and in respect of the prosecution of such complaints before the
Board. . . ." See NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132 (1975); Saez v. Goslee, 463
F.2d 214 (1st Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1024 (1972), and case. there cited. The General
Counsel plays a major role not only in the enforcement but also in th, formulation and develop-
ment of national labor policy, and his decisions are thus highly relevant to any meaningtul
analysis of NLRA doctrine. Further, the General Counsel's refusal to issue a complaint is in flt
an adjudication of unfair labor practice claims. 421 U.S. at 141, 148.
48. NLRB Gen. Counsel Q. Rep., [1977] 95 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 110, 114-15.
49. Id. at 115.
50. Id.
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ployees to prevent their unionization, told employees that others had
been discharged because of their union activity, and promised to give
raises to the employees if they would abandon their union activity.
Although the union could establish that it had secured a substantial
number of authorization cards from the employees, it could not dem-
onstrate that it had ever achieved majority status. The General Coun-
sel nevertheless authorized a complaint seeking an order requiring the
employer to bargain with the union as a remedy for the section 8(a)(1)
and (3) violations.
In NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co. 51 the Supreme Court held that
the Board has the power to issue a bargaining order when independent
unfair labor practices make holding a fair election impossible or im-
probable. The Court said that the Board could issue a bargaining
order in exceptional cases marked-by outrageous and pervasive unfair
labor practices, the so-called Gissel I situation. As discussed more
fully below, it is not clear from the Court's decision whether a reme-
dial bargaining order can issue in such a situation if the union has never
attained a majority. The Court also said that the Board could issue a
bargaining order in less extraordinary cases marked by less pervasive
practices which tend to undermine majority strength and to impede
the election processes, the so-called Gissel II situation.52 No bargain-
ing order is appropriate, said the Court, in the case of minor or less
extensive unfair labor practices which have a minimal effect on the
election machinery, the so-called Gissel III situation.53
The cases before the Court involved Gissel 11 situations---"less
extraordinary cases marked by less pervasive practices which none-
theless still have the tendency to undermine majority strength and im-
pede the election processes" 4 -where the unions had in fact attained
51. 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
52. The Court stated:
The only effect of our holding here is to approve the Board's use of the bargaining
order in less extraordinary cases marked by less pervasive practices %hich nonetheless
still have the tendency to undermine majority strength and impede the election pro-
cesses. The Board's authority to issue such an order on a lesser showing of employer
misconduct is appropriate, we should reemphasize, where there is also a shoing that at
one point the union had a majority, in such a case, of course, effectuating ascertainable
employee free choice becomes as important a goal as deterring employer misbehavior.
In fashioning a remedy in the exercise of its discretion, then, the Board can properly
take into consideration the extensiveness of the employer's unfair practices in terms of
their past effect on election conditions and the likelihood of their recurrence in the future.
If the Board finds that the possibility of erasing the effects of past practices and of ensur-
ing a fair election (or a fair rerun) by the use of traditional remedies, though present, is
slight and that employee sentiment once expressed through cards would, on balance, be
better protected by a bargaining order, then such an order should issue....
Id. at 614-15.
53. !Eg., Frito-lay, Inc., 232 N.L.R.B. No. 119, 96 LR.R.M. 1335 (1977); Beasley Energy,
Inc., 228 N.L.R.B. No. 16, 94 L.R.R.M. 1563 (1977); General Stencils, Inc., 195 N.LR.B. 1109
(1972), enforcement denied, 472 F.2d 170 (2d Cir. 1972).
54. 395 U.S. at 614.
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the requisite majority status at one time. The Gissel II situations ap-
pear to be analogous to and consistent with prior rulings of the Court
upholding bargaining orders where the union's once-attained majority
status had been lost or dissipated due to employer unfair labor prac-
tices or employee turnover." As noted above, however, it is not clear
whether majority status is a prerequisite to issuance of a bargaining
order in a Gissel I situation. Nor is it clear whether the Court even
intended to speak authoritatively on the issue. The answer, for
those (unlike this writer) skillful enough to extract it, lies in the follow-
ing ambiguous passage in Gissel:
[T]he actual area of disagreement between our position here and that of
the Fourth Circuit is not large as a practical matter. While refusing to
validate the general use of a bargaining order in reliance on cards[ 1" 1
the Fourth Circuit nevertheless left -open the possibility of imposing a
bargaining order, without need of inquiry into majority status on the
basis of cards or otherwise, in "exceptional" cases marked by "out-
rageous" and "pervasive" unfair labor practices. Such an order would
be an appropriate remedy for those practices, the court noted, if they
are of "such a nature that their coercive effects cannot be eliminated
by the application of traditional remedies, with the result that a fair
and reliable election cannot be had." N.L.R.B. v. Logan Packing Co.,
386 F.2d 562, 570 (C.A. 4th Cir. 1967); see also N.L.R.B. v. Heck's, Inc.,
398 F.2d 337, 338.
5
Both NLRB v. Heck's, Inc., and NLRB v. Logan Packing Co.,
cited by the Supreme Court, involved situations where the unions had
in fact acquired a majority of authorization cards. The Fourth Cir-
cuit refused to approve bargaining orders in this situation because of
its views that authorization cards were unreliable. In Heck's the
court noted, "This is not one of those extraordinary cases in which a
bargaining order might be an appropriate remedy for pervasive viola-
tions of § 8(a)(l). ''5 In Logan Packing the court similarly rejected
the issuance of a bargaining order in the particular case before it as a
55. E.g., NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 748 n,16 (1962); Frank. Bros. Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S.
702 (1944); NLRB v. P. Lorillard Co., 314 U.S. 512 (1942).
56. In Gissel the Court held, contrary to the Fourth Circuit, that authorization cards may
be used as valid indications of a union's majority and to support a bargaining order, Great Ati,
& Pac. Tea Co., 230 N.L.R.B. No. 102, 96 L.R.R.M. 1245 (1977). Concerning the general problemq
of authorization cards see Note, Refusal-To-Recognize Charges Under Section 8(a)(5) of the
NLRA: Card Checks and Employee Free Choice, 33 U. Ciii. L. REv. 387 (1966); Note, Union
Authorization Cards 75 YALE L.J. 805 (1966).
57. 395 U.S. at 613-14. Professor Gorman has said of this passage that "the Court
appeared to suggest that it would not be necessary in such cases to inquire into majority status
on the basis of cards." R. GORMAN, LABOR LAW UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAIN.
ING 95 (1976).
58. NLRB v. Heck's, Inc., 398 F.2d 337, 338 (4th Cir. 1968). The court upheld the Board's
finding that the employer violated § 8(a)(l) of the Act (29 U.S.C, § 158(a)(1)(1970)) by interroga-
tion, threats of reprisal, creating the impression of surveillance, and offering benefits. The court
also upheld the Board's finding that the employer violated § 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act (29 U.S.C.
§ 158(A)(3), (1) (1970)) by unlawfully discharging one employee.
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remedy for the employer's independent violations of section 8(a)(1).59
The court added, however, in the dictum which formed the predicate
for the ambiguity in Gissel, that in "exceptional" cases involving "out-
rageous" and "pervasive" unfair labor practices precluding the hold-
ing of a fair election the Board "may have the power" to issue a bar-
gaining order as a remedy for the unfair labor practices. 6° Such an
order would then be imposed, said the court, "without need of an-
swering the question whether the union ever obtained majority sta-
tus., 61  The court cautioned that "[t]he remedy is an extraordinary
one, however, and, in light of the guaranty of § 7 of employees'
rights not to be represented, its use, if ever appropriate, must be re-
served for extraordinary cases. 62
No case has been found in which the Board has issued a bargain-
ing order without a finding that the union has at some point attained a
majority. 63 The General Counsel now appears to have taken the posi-
tion that Gissel approved a remedial bargaining order even when a
union's majority status cannot be established if the employer's unfair
labor practices are outrageous and pervasive and if (1) the union has
established that a substantial number of employees, although less
than a majority, have selected the union as a representative and (2)
the evidence shows a causal connection between the unfair labor
practices and the union's failure to attain majority status. The Gen-
eral Counsel appears to have taken the further position that even
where such a causal connection is not established, a bargaining order
is still appropriate when based upon the existence of outrageous and
pervasive unfair labor practices along with the showing that a sub-
stantial number of employees, though less than a majority, have
selected the union.
Both of the General Counsel's positions embody a "but-for" pre-
sumption; an inference is drawn that but for the employer's unfair labor
practices, a majority of employees would have selected the union as
their bargaining representative. The inference is more easily drawn
when both (1) substantiality and (2) causal connection are present.
When, for example, a union has steadily and progressively signed up
59. The court upheld the Board's findings that the employer engaged in unlawful interroga-
tion and surveillance in violation of § 8(a)(1). The court did comment, however, that the evidence
of violations was "minimal." NLRB v. S.S. Logan Packing Co., 386 F.2d 562,564 (4th Cir. 1967).
60. 386 F.2d at 570.
61. Id.
62. 386 F.2d at 570-71.
63. Eg., Loray Corp., 184 N.L.R.B. 557 (1970). For compilations of cases in which the
Board and the courts have determined which unfair labor practices warrant Gissel bargaining
orders when the union has attained majority status see THE DEvoLOPING LABOR LAw (C. Morris, ed.
1971) (1976 Supp. at 74-77) and (1971-75 Cum. Supp. at 146-50). See generally Carson, The
Gissel Doctrine: When A Bargaining Order Will Issue, 41 FORD. L. REV. 85 (1972); Comment,
Bargaining Orders Since Gissel Packing: 7-Ine to Blow the Whistle on Gissel? 1972 Wis. L
REV. 1170.
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a substantial number of employees in a short period, and following
the employer's unfair labor practices, only a few or no employees sign
up, the inference that but for the unfair labor practices the union
probably would have attained a majority may be well-founded. In a
situation where only the factor of substantiality is present, the draw-
ing of the inference is necessarily more strained.
Under either position, the General Counsel's utilization of a but-
for analysis places the emphasis upon the effectuation of employee
free choice, even though that free choice is in fact unascertainable
and the effectuation incorporates a legal fiction. A lesser emphasis
appears to be placed upon the utilization of an extreme remedy
simply to deter employer misconduct and to preclude the employer
from profiting from the unfair labor practices. Viewed with the em-
phasis on employee free choice rather than employer deterrence, the
General Counsel's theories are arguably far more permissibly reme-
dial and far less impermissibly punitive. And the situation is therefore
arguably quite different from that in the Local 57, ILG WU v. NLRB
(Garwin Corp)6 4 runaway shop context in which a union would be
imposed upon a unit of employees none or few of whom have ever
designated the union as their bargaining representative.
These determinations of the General Counsel may well neither
reach the Board nor pose the majority issue if they do reach the Board.
The General Counsel will presumably continue to issue complaints in
appropriate cases that do raise the issue. The General Counsel has
taken a major step in furthering employee free choice. Whether sec-
tion 3(d)65 contemplates such action without more direct encourage-
ment in Board or court decisions can be soundly debated. That a
union that has never attained majority status is to be imposed upon
employees and employer is a proposition of novel and maJor dimen-
sions.66 The Gissel passages discussed above are. at best ambigu-
ous. On the one hand, it seems highly unlikely that the Supreme
Court meant to announce such a proposition by way of vague dictum.
Indeed, a substantial argument may be made that the proposition is
so laden with fundamental policy issues and conflicts that go to the
heart of the Act that the matter is appropriate only for Congress to de-
termine. On the other hand, it obviously cannot be denied that Gissel
is both ambiguous and suggestive. The better -view would therefore
seem to be that under the bifurcated structure of the NLRB, the
General Counsel has a duty to place the issue before the Board for
resolution. In this light, the General Counsel engaged in an approp-
riate exercise of his discretion by issuing the complaints.
64. 374 F.2d 295 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 942 (1 67).
65. The General Counsel has essentially unreviewable discretion over whether to issue
unfair labor practice complaints. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 183 (1967).
66. But see ILGWU v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731 (1961).
[Vol. 39:1
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
III. AVAILABILITY OF BOARD PROCESSES TO
PROTECT BASIC EMPLOYEE RIGHTS
Protection of employees who initiate and participate in unfair
labor practice proceedings before the Board is essential to any mean-
ingful protection against infringement of fundamental section 7
rights. 67  Section 8(a)(4) effects this protection by making it an un-
fair labor practice for an employer to discriminate against an em-
ployee for filing charges or giving testimony under the Act." The
extent to which the Board will go to protect fundamental employee
fights is highlighted by the Board's recent extension of the section
8(a)(4) protections to non-employees.
In*General Services, Inc.,69 the Board held that an employer vio-
lated section 8(a)(4) by refusing to rehire a lawfully discharged super-
visor because the supervisor had filed charges with the Board. Fol-
lowing his discharge by the employer, the supervisor filed a section
8(a)(1) and (3) charge with the Board, alleging that he had been
discharged because of his union activity. Although the supervisor
later admitted that he had been hired as a supervisor,70 he stated in
the charge that he was not told he was a supervisor until the two-
week period between the start of -his union activity and his discharge.
Shortly after his discharge a Board agent advised the supervisor to
ask the employer for reinstatement. When the supervisor asked one
of the employer's managers if the employer was hiring, the manager
advised the supervisor that if he wrote the employer's president he
would probably be rehired. The supervisor gave the manager a letter
requesting reinstatement, was assured by the manager that authori-
zation to reinstate him would undoubtedly be forthcoming, and with-
drew his section 8(a)(1) and (3) charge.
67. In Nash v. Florida Industrial Comm., 389 U.S. 235, 238 (1967) the Court stated that:
The National Labor Relations Act is a comprehensive code passed by Congress to
regulate labor relations in activities affecting interstate and foreign commerce ...
Implementation of the Act is dependent upon the initiative of individual persons %ho
must . . . invoke its sanctions through filing an unfair labor practice charge. Congress
has made it clear that it wishes all persons with information about such practices to be
completely free from coercion against reporting them to the Board. This is shown by
its adoption of § 8(a)(4) which makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to dis-
criminate against an employee because he has filed charges .... And it has been held
that it is unlawful for an employer to seek to restrain an employee in the exercise of his
right to file charges.
68. Section 8(a)(4) of the Act (29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4) (1970)) provides specifically that "(a)
It shall be ail unfair labor practice for an employer - . . . (4) to discharge or otherwise dis-
criminate against an employee because he has filed charges or given testimony under this
Act; . . ." Section 8(a)(4) has been liberally construed and includes not only charges and
testimony but also the giving of sworn statements. NLRB v. Scrivener, 405 U.S. 117 (1972).
69. General Serv., Inc., 229 N.L.R.B. No. 134, 95 L.R.R.M. 1174(1977) (Chairman Fanning
with Members Jenkins and Murphy for the majority, and Members Penello and Walther dissent-
ing).
70. At the subsequent hearing on the § 8(a)(4) charge the supervisor testified that he had
been hired as a supervisor.
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About ten days later, the manager told the supervisor that the
employer's president had been notified of the supervisor's charge
and had also received the letter. He indicated that the president
would not take any action on the reinstatement request at least until
the charge was withdrawn and probably not until after seeing the
results of an upcoming union election. The supervisor then filed a
second section 8(a)(1) and (3) charge, again alleging that his initial
discharge was unlawful. The Board's regional director dismissed the
charge on the ground that the supervisor had been found to be a su-
pervisor in an earlier representation proceeding. The supervisor then
filed the instant section 8(a)(1) and (4) charges.
The Board held that the employer's refusal to rehire the super-
visor because the supervisor had filed charges with the Board was
violative of section 8(a)(4). The Board found that congressional ex-
clusion of supervisors from the statutory definition of employee in
section 2(3)71 was not intended to exclude supervisors from coverage
under section 8(a)(4), and that supervisors must be included in order
to protect and preserve the efficacy of the Board's remedial processes.
The Board stated:
In this case, McCracken, unsure of his status as supervisor or em-
ployee, filed an 8(a)(3) charge with the Board alleging that he was
discharged because of his union activity. Clearly, in order to perform
its statutory function of determining whether an unfair labor practice
occurred, the Board would have to rule on McCracken's status as statu-
tory supervisor or rank-and-file employee. . . . [T]he purpose of Sec-
tion 8(a)(4) is to insure that the Board will be able to make that unfair
labor practice determination by protecting from reprisal employees who
file unfair labor practice charges and thus encouraging them to report
such allegations to the Board. We believe, therefore, that for the pur-
pose of processing his charge McCracken must be considered an "em-
ployee" within the meaning of Section 8(a)(4).12
Under the original NLRA the Board had held, with Supreme
Court approval, not only that supervisors were included under the pro-
tections of section 8(a)(3) but also that supervisors had bargaining
rights under section 9.73 In the 1947 Taft-Hartley amendments Con-
71. Section 2(3) of the Act (29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1970)) provides in part "The term 'employee'
shall include any employee . . . but shall not include . . . any individual employed as a super-
visor .... " The term "supervisor" is defined in § 2(11) (29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1970)).
72. 95 L.R.R.M. at 1175-76. In their dissent Members Penello and Walther termed the
majority's holding "a bizarre construction of the statute." 95 L.R.R.M. at 1178.
73. Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485 (1947); Jone; & Laughlin Steel Corp., 66
N.L.R.B. 386 (1946). In Packard Motor Car, the Court stated:
[T]here is nothing in the Act which indicates that Congress intended to deny its benelits
to foremen as employees, if they choose to believe that their interests as employees
would be better served by organization than by individual competition. . ..
There is no more reason to conclude that the law prohibits toremen as a class from
constituting an appropriate bargaining unit than there is for concluding that they are not
within the Act at all.
330 U.S. at 490-91.
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gress rejected the Board's policy of giving supervisors employee sta-
tus under the Act, and provided in section 2(3) that "employee" does
not include "any individual employed as a supervisor."74  As stated
by Mr. Justice Harlan:
When in 1947 the National Labor Relations Act was amended to
exclude supervisory workers from the critical definition of "employees,"
§ 2(3), it followed that many provisions of the Act employing that pivotal
term would cease to operate where supervisors were the focus of con-
cern. Most obviously, § 7 no longer bestows upon supervisory em-
ployees the rights to engage in self-organization, collective bargaining
and other concerted activities under the umbrella of § 8 of the Act ....
Accordingly, subsequent to the 1947 amendment it has been held
generally that an employer does not violate section 8(a)(1) or (3) by
discharging a supervisor for engaging in union activity.
76
Not ,ithstanding the general exclusion of supervisors from the
protection of the Act, the Board has held that the discharge of a super-
visor may violate section 8(a)(1) where the discharge in fact inter-
feres with the protected section 7 rights of statutory employc s. Such
a situation may occur when supervisors are discharged for their failure
to wage an effective antiunion campaign for their employer.7 The
rationale for this exception is that the net effect of the conduct is a
reasonable fear on the part of employees that they too will suffer retal-
iation for their union activities. The Board has applied a similar
rationale to find that the discharge of a supervisor for giving testimony
to the Board, adverse to the employer and in vindication of employees'
rights, violates section 8(a)(1). 78 Thus, such employer conduct may
74. See note 71 supra. Section 14(a) of Taft-Hartley (29 U.S.C. § 164(a) (1970)) preserved
the right of supervisors to become union members but also made clear that supervisors were not to
be regarded as employees. Section 14(a) states that:
Nothing herein shall prohibit any individual employed as a supervisor from becoming
or remaining a member of a labor organization, but no employer subject to this act shall
be compelled to deem individuals defined herein as supervisors as employees for the
purpose of any law, either national or local, relating to collective bargaining.
See NLRB v. Edward G. Budd Mfg. Co., 169 F.2d 571 (6th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 908
(1948).
75. Hanna Mining Co. v. District 2, MEBA, 382 U.S. 181, 188 (1965). See generally
Florida Power & Light Co. v. IBEW Local 641, 417 U.S. 790 (1974); Beasley v. Food Fair. Inc.,
416 U.S. 653 (1974); NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974); MEBA v. Interlake S.S.
Co., 370 U.S. 173 (1962).
76. !-g., NLRB v. Inter-City Advertising Co., 190 F.2d 420, 422 (4th Cir. 1951), cert.
denied, 342 U.S. 908 (1952).
77. See NLRB v. Talladega Cotton Factory., Inc., 213 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1954).
78. Oil City Brass Works v. NLRB, 357 F.2d 466 (5th Cir. 1966); NLRB v. Better Monkey
Grip Co., 243 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 864 (1957). Chief Judge Ri s
stated in Oil City that:
The Board's order should be enforced as an inherent protection of its source of in-
formation necessary to protect rank-and-file employees in the exercise of their statutory
rights ....
Rank-and-file employees have a right to have their privileges secured by the
Act vindicated through the effective administrative proceedings provided by Congress.
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restrain employees in the exercise of their section 7 rights and may
also impede the functioning of the Board's prccesses for protection
of those rights.79
While the foregoing rationale may well justify the finding of a
section 8(a)(1) violation when the supervisory discharge or other
discrimination relates to the section 7 rights of rank-and-file em-
ployees, the rationale hardly justifies the general finding of an inde-
pendent section 8(a)(4) violation in favor of supervisors. Section
8(a)(4) proscribes discrimination against an "employee," and sec-
tion 2(3) makes clear that a supervisor is not an employee under the
Act. The distinction appears particularly significant in a case such
as General Services. The supervisor was discharged for cause,
made legal by this statutory exclusion, not for activity which in-
fringed in any way the exercise of section 7 rightw by employees. The
supervisor had no legitimate claim for relief before the Board, nor
was the supervisor seeking to vindicate the rights of employees. To
predicate the finding of a section 8(a)(4) violation upon the mere fact
that the supervisor sought recourse before the Board, therefore,
seems to be without foundation. Simple entry into the Board's regional
offices should not by itself create statutory rights and protections.
General Services appears to be an extreme case. It would be
gross understatement to suggest that the Board engaged in consid-
erable straining and bootstrapping to find a vioration. The decision
is significant in that it illustrates the Board's concern that its remedial
processes be and remain open to the fullest extent possible for the
protection of employees' section 7 rights against dilution or infringe-
ment.80
Included in this privilege is the right to have witnesses testify without fear of being pe-
nalized by their employer. As in the instant case, it may often be necessary to have super-
visory personnel testify. It follows, therefore, that any discrimination against supervisory
personnel because of testimony before the Board directly infringe-s the right of rank-and-
file employees to a congressionally provided, effective administrative process, in violation
of section 8(a)(1) ...
357 F.2d at 471. See The Permian Corp., 189 N.L.R.B. 860, 863.64 (1971). See also NLRB
Gen. Counsel Q. Rep., [1977] 97 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 41, 42-43, where the General Counel
found that the employer violated § 8(a)(l) by discharging a managerial employee for aiding and
advising statutory employees of their rights under the Fair Labor Standards Act,
79. NLRB v. Carter Lumber, Inc., 507 F.2d 1262 (6th Cir. 197,f); NLRB v. Dal-Tex Optical
Co., 310 F.2d 58 (5th Cir. 1962). See NLRB v. Scrivener, 405 U.S. 117 (1972),
80. Board concern that its processes be available for vindication of basic statutory rightq
is also reflected in the Board's retrenchment in the pre-arbitration deferral policies of Collyer
Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837 (1971). See General American Transp. Corp., 228 N.L.R.B.
No. 102, 94 L.R.R.M. 1483 (1977), in which the Board held that geierally it would not defer to
arbitration in cases involving employer discrimination or interference with protected rights, or
in cases of union coercion of employees. See also National Rejectors Inds,, 234 N.LRB,
No. 34, 97 L.R.R.M. 1142 (1978); Roy Robinson, Inc., 228 N.L.R.B No. 103, 94 L.R.R.M. 1474
(1977). There are also indications that the Board is retrenching in the post-arbitration deferral
policies of Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955). See Filmation Assoc,, Inc., 227
N.L.R.B. No. 237, 94 L.R.R.M. 1470 (1977) (no deferral for alleged Niolations of § 8(a)(4)).
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IV. PROTECTING EMPLOYEE FREE SPEECH
The right of employees to engage in free discussion of labor dis-
putes and unionization is a bedrock principle of constitutional dimen-
sions8' that is central to the organizational and other concerted activ-
ities protected by section 7.82 National labor policy "manifests a
congressional intent to encourage free debate on issues dividing labor
and management," and care must be taken to minimize intrusions or
threats of intrusion which might "dampen the ardor of labor debate
and truncate the free discussion envisioned by the Act .... ,,3 It
would seem that diminution of the right of employees to speak out in
labor disputes would be the most effective means to curtail and negate
unionization and collective bargaining. Again, the recent theme of
the NLRB, both Board and General Counsel, appears to be a livelier
recognition and reaffirmation of the fundamental section 7 right of
employee free speech.
A. Bumper Sticker Boycott and Press Release
In one case the General Counsel authorized issuance of a com-
plaint alleging that the employer violated section 8(a)(3) and (1) by
imposing a disciplinary layoff upon a non-striking, non-bargaining unit
employee who displayed bumper stickers on his car urging a boycott
of the struck employer's products.84 The employee was a member of
the striking union but was in a different bargaining unit from the
strikers. During the strike he parked his car in the employee parking
81. In the circumstances of our times the dissemination of information concerning the
facts of a labor dispute must be regarded as within that area of free discussion that is
guaranteed by the Constitution. . . . Free discussion concerning the conditions in indus-
try and the causes of labor disputes appears to us indispensable to the effective and intel-
ligent use of the processes of popular government to shape the destiny of modern indus-
trial society.
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102-03 (1940). "The right thus to discuss, and inform people
concerning, the advantages and disadvantages of unions and joining them is protected not only
as part of free speech, but as part of free assembly." Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 532
(1944); Schneider v. Irvington, 308 U.S. 147 (1939); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939). See
NLRB v. Servette, Inc., 377 U.S. 46, 55 (1964); NLRB v. Fruit Packers, Local 760, 377 U.S.
58 (1964); Local 399, Carpenters (K & K Constr. Co.,), 233 N.L.R.B. No. 99, 96 LR.R.M. 1575
(1977). But cf. Teamsters, Local 695 v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284 (1957) (limitations on Thorn-
hill doctrine). See generally Cox, Strikes, Picketing and the Constitution, 4 VA',D L REv. 574
(1951); Note, The Invisible Hand and the Clenched Fist: Is There a Safe lby to Picket Under
the First Amendment?, 26 HAsT. L.J. 167 (1976).
82. "No restriction may be placed on the employees' right to discuss self-organization
among themselves, unless the employer can demonstrate that a restriction is necessary to main-
tain production or discipline." NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 113 (1956). Accord.
Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976); Old Dominion Branch 496, NALC v. Austin. 418 U.S.
264 (1974); NLRB v. Magnavox Co., 415 U.S. 322 (1974); Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB.
324 U.S. 793 (1945). See Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Org., 420
U.S. 50 (1975); NLRB v. IBEW, Local 1229, 346 U.S. 464 (1953).
83. Linn v. Plant Guard Workers Local 114, 383 U.S. 53, 62, 64 (1966).
84. NLRB Gen. Counsel Q. Rep., [1976] 95 LAB. REL REP. [BNA] 81, 83-84. But see
Capital limes Co., 234 N.L.R.B. No. 62, 97 L.R.R.M. 1184 (1978).
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lot and displayed on it bumper stickers that urged a boycott of the
employer's products as well as support of the union. The General
Counsel found that the boycott signs constituted a privileged appeal
for support of the striking union's boycott of the employer made in
the context of a labor dispute and for the purpose of protesting the
employer's labor policies. 85  The signs did not disparage the quality
of the employer's product, and did not contain any offensive language.
The General Counsel also noted that the bumper stickers were visible
for the most part by fellow employees during their nonwork time,
and would have been seen by customers and plant visitors, if at all,
merely in passing.8 6  The General Counsel concluded that the "em-
ployee's display of these signs, undertaken in concert with other em-
ployees then on strike, was accordingly considered to be activity pro-
tected by the Act. 87  NLRB v. Washington Ahtminum Co." makes
clear that section 7's broad protection of concerted activities is not
unlimited, and that protection may be forfeited where the employee
conduct is unlawful, violent, in breach of contract, or may be "classified
as 'indefensible' by any recognized standard of conduct." 9  When
employees involved in a labor dispute disparage the quality of the
employer's product in a way which is unrelated to that labor dispute,
their conduct is generally regarded as disloyal, and within the cate-
gory of unprotected "indefensible" activity.90 Closely related is the
85. Concerning the general rights of sympathy strikers see Buffalo Forge Co. v. Steel-
workers, 428 U.S. 397 (1976); Cedar Coal Co. v. UMW, 560 F.2d 1153 (4th Cir. 1977); U.S,
Steel Corp. v. UMW Local 6321, 548 F.2d 67 (3rd Cir. 1976); Gary Hobart Water Corp, v. NLRB,
511 F.2d 284 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 925 (1975); Am. Tel. & Tel. Co, 231
N.L.R.B. No. 110, 96 L.R.R.M. 1144 (1977); NLRB Gen. Counsel Q. Rep., [1976] 95 LAr. Rt,
REP. [BNA] 81.
86. The § 7 concept of concerted activity for mutual aid and protection was recently
extended by the General Counsel in a related area in a novel case involving a single employee's
sympathy strike. NLRB Gen. Counsel Q. Rep., [1977] 95 LAB. REL. REP. [BNA] 81. 81-83,
The General Counsel found that an individual statutory employee was engaged in protected con-
certed activity when he refused to cross a possibly unlawful picket line maintained by non-
statutory employees. The General Counsel stated:
Sympathy strikes are considered protected on the view that the) act on the expectation
or possibility that the primary strikers will "return the favor" in the event of a dispute
between the sympathy strikers and their employer. . . . [1In making common cause
with the striking nonstatutory employees, the statutory employee could reasonably be
taken to have acted on the assumption that their "return of the favor" would inure not
simply to his benefit individually but to the benefit of his fellow employees and his bar-
gaining representative-a Section 2(5) labor organization-as well.
Id. at 82.
87. NLRB Gen. Counsel Q. Rep., [1976] 95 LAB. REL. REP. [BNA] 84.
88. 370 U.S. 9 (1962).
89. Id. at 17.
90. A leading example of employees' public criticism of their employer's product amounting
to disloyalty because the criticism exceeded the legitimate bounds ol the labor dispute is NLRB
v. Local 1229, IBEW (Jefferson Standard Broadcasting Co.), 346 U.S. 464 (1953), The em-
ployees in that case distributed handbills which did not refer to the labor dispute but rather made
a general attack upon the public policies of the employer and the quality of the employer's prod-
uct.
Separable acts of insubordination or disobedience occurring simultaneously with participa-
tion in concerted activities are also regarded as indefensible conduct and 1hus unprotected by
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boycott of the employer's product by employees actually employed
and being paid wages and boycott activities that are patently incon-
sistent with the nature of the employment. 9' As stated by the Sixth
Circuit, "An employer is not required, under the Act, to finance a
boycott against himself. '92 While the Board and the courts frequently
differ in this area,93 and while the rationales of both are cloudy to
say the least, it would seem that the conduct is unprotected when it
can in fact or in effect be regarded as on-duty conduct by the em-
ployee.94  When the conduct occurs during the employee's off-duty
time, however, and is not somehow flatly inconsistent with the na-
ture of the employment, there is no valid reason to treat the conduct
as unprotected. Thus, for example, picket line appeals by off-duty
restaurant employees to restaurant customers not to cross a picket line
at the restaurant have been regarded as protected.95
Under the foregoing doctrines the bumper sticker boycott by an
on-duty employee presents a very close question. The employee had
neither disparaged the employer's product, nor failed in any way to
perform the work for which he was employed and being paid. To
regard the employee's car in the parking lot as a constructive exten-
sion of the employee tantamount to on-duty picketing or similar ac-
tivity seems an unwarranted strain. Absent disparagement or inade-
quate on-duty work performance there would appear to be no valid
basis for limiting the employee speech involved, and the General
Counsel's determination that the activity was protected seems emi-
nently appropriate.
The Board's broad solicitude for the right of employees to speak
the umbrella of the concerted activity. Similarly, distinctions may have to be drawn %here
political appeals occur simultaneously with appeals concerning employment conditions. Eg.,
Eastex Inc. v. NLRB, 550 F.2d 198, (5th Cir. 1977) alJ'd 46 U.S.L.W. 4783 (U.S. June 22, 1978).
See generally Schatzki, Some Observations and Suggestions Concerning a Misnomer-"Pro-
tected" Concerted Activities, 47 TEx. L. REv. 378 (1969); Getman, The Protection of Economic
National Labor Relations Act, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 1195 (1967); Cox, The Right to Engage in
Concerted Activities, 26 IND. L.J. 319 (1951).
Breach of confidentiality by the employee, such as unauthorized use of disclosure of confi-
dential information simultaneously with engagement in protected activity, is another prime exam-
ple of conduct regarded as disloyalty. American Arbitration Ass'n, 233 N.LR.B. No. 12, 96
L.R.R.M. 1431 (1977); NLRB v. Knuth Bros., Inc., 537 F.2d 950 (7th Cir. 1976). denying enforce-
ment to 218 N.L.R.B. 869 (1975). But see Buddies Super Markets, 223 N.L.R.B. No. 137, 92
L.R.R.M. 1008 (1976); Circle Bindery, Inc., 218 N.L.R.B. 861 (1975), enforced 536 F.2d 447
(Ist Cir. 1976); Jeanette Corp., 217 N.L.R.B. No. 122, (1975), enforced 532 F.2d 916 (3rd Cir.
1976). Cf. NLRB Gen. Counsel Q. Rep. [1977], 97 LAB. Re.. REP. 41, 44-45 (the General
Counsel found that a union had violated § 8(b)(1)(A) by its attempt to bribe an employee to fur-
nish the union with confidential records of the employer).
91. E-g., Boeing Airplane Co. v. NLRB, 238 F.2d 188 (9th Cir. 1956); The Hoover Co. v.
NLRB, 191 F.2d 380 (6th Cir. 1951).
92. The Hoover Co. v. NLRB, 191 F.2d 380, 390 (6th Cir. 1951).
93. See note 89 supra.
94. See Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 200 N.L.R.B. 667 (1972) (Board held that the employer
could properly require employees to leave work if they persisted in wearing sweatshirts vhich
read "Ma Bell is a Cheap Mother"); Patterson-Sargent Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 1627 (1956).
95. Edir, Inc. (Wolfie's), 159 N.L.R.B. 686 (1966).
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out publicly concerning their grievances was further reflected in an
analogous situation in Automobile Club.96  In that case, the union
and a group of employees filed a court action alleging that the em-
ployer had wrongfully deprived the employees of earned commis-
sions and had converted the commissions to its own use. Thereafter
the employees' attorney issued a press release which described the
lawsuit. The press release claimed that for six years the employer
had unlawfully denied and withheld commissions from the employees,
discriminated against the employees, and wrongfully engaged in a
"skim off' of the employees' commissions. The release also stated
that the employees were loyal to the employer, believed they were
engaged in selling "the best product in the world," and that they
were proud to represent the employer.97  Numerous newspapers
printed stories based upon the press release. The employer regarded
the press release as a "vitriolic attack" upon the employer's product.
The employer suspended the employees and later discharged them
when they refused to sign affidavits disavowing portions of the press
release. The Board found that the issuance of -the press release was
protected concerted activity under section 7, and that the employer's
suspension and discharge of the employees therefore violated section
8(a)(1). 98 Member Murphy joined in the majority opinion but further
predicated her analysis on constitutional grounds. While she found
some merit in the employer's position that the press release consti-
tuted a vitriolic attack on the product, in her view "the employees'
rights to issue the press release are protected by the first amendment
to the United States Constitution."9
In the foregoing cases the Board and the General Counsel re-
jected the employers' contentions that the employees' appeals to the
public for support of the employees' labor disputes and grievances
constituted disloyalty or insubordination. The theme is again evi-
dent of an expansive rather than a niggardly reading of the funda-
mental rights of free speech and discussion in labor disputes con-
tained in section 7. Concepts in labor relations such as disloyalty
and insubordination border on the pernicious. In real life, as experi-
enced management lawyers might concede, the concepts mean any-
thing employees do or say that the employer does not like. The con-
cepts are so vague that they almost defy definition. Moreover, they
96. 231 N.L.R.B. No. 99, 96 L.R.R.M. 1267 (1977). Accord, American Hosp. Ass'n, 230
N.L.R.B. No. 10, 95 L.R.R.M. 1266 (1977).
97. 96 L.R.R.M. at 1268.
98. The General Counsel had contended before the Board that the suspensions and dis-
charges were violative of § 8(a)(1) for the additional reason that they were based in part upon the
employees' protected concerted activity in filing the lawsuit. The Board found it unnecessary to
reach the contention because it considered its broad order sufficiert to remedy any additional
violations. Id.
99. Id.
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suggest a highly militaristic and paternalistic view of the industrial
environment. Application of these concepts to disqualify employees
from the protections of section 7 should be reserved for the most
severe and egregious situations where the conduct truly precludes a
further viable employment relationship.
B. Criminal Prosecution for Protected Distribution of Literature
Protection of employees' section 7 rights of free discussior, of
labor disputes, and the problems of providing prompt and effective
remedies against infringement of such rights, were highlighted in the
following case. The General Counsel had previously found that the
employer violated section 8(a)(3) and (1) by discharging an employee
and a complaint had issued concerning the discharge'ti Subsequently
the discharged employee began to distribute literature in the employ-
er's parking lot protesting the employer's working conditions. The
employer had the employee arrested. The arrest led to the institution
of a state court criminal trespass proceeding which was awaiting
trial when the case came back to the General Counsel. The General
Counsel found that the employer had violated section 8(a)(1) by causing
the arrest of the employee. 10' The General Counsel then sought and ob-
tained authorization from the Board for the institution of section 10()
injunction proceedings.
Section 10j) provides that after a complaint has issued alleging a
violation of any section of the Act, the Board can seek temporary
injunctive relief in the appropriate United States district court.lt z The
purpose of a section 10() injunction is to prevent a respondent from
frustrating the purposes and policies of the Act and accomplishing an
illegal objective prior to imposition of any legal restraint by the
Board. The injunctive relief contemplated is interlocutory to the
final disposition of the unfair labor practice matters pending before
the Board and expires when the Board renders its final decision.1
0 3
100. NLRB Gen. Counsel Q. Rep., [1977] 96 LAB. REL REP. [BNA] 1, 9. Concerning the
general rights of employees and non-employees to distribute literature on the employer's premises
see cases cited note 80 supra.
101. Accord, Little Rock Crate & Basket Co., 227 N.L.R.B. No. 192, 94 L.R.R.M. 1385
(1977), in which the Board found that an employer violated § 8(aXl) by threatening to cause the
arrest of a discharged employee who brought union literature onto the employer's premises.
102. Section 106) states:
The Board shall have power, upon issuance of a complaint as provided in subsection (b)
of this section charging that any person has engaged in or is engaging in an unfair labor
practice, to petition any United States district court, within any district wherein the un-
fair labor practice in question is alleged to have occurred or wherein such person resides
or transacts business, for appropriate temporary relief or restraining order. Upon the
filing of any such petition the court shall cause notice thereof to be served upon such
person, and thereupon shall have jurisdiction to grant to the Board such temporary relief
or restraining order as it deems just and proper.
29 U.S.C. § 1606) (1970).
103. Eisenburg v. Hartz Mountain Corp., 519 F.2d 138 (3d Cir. 1975); Seeler v. Trading
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In the instant case the General Counsel and the Board consid-
ered injunctive relief necessary to prevent the trial from being tanta-
mount to a penalty for the employee's exercise of section 7 rights,
to avoid the chilling effect such a penalty would have upon employee
rights generally, and to preclude state intrusion into federally pro-
tected rights in derogation of the Board's jurisdiction. The General
Counsel sought section 10(j) relief that would ;:-equire the employer
to grant the employee permission to distribute literature in the park-
ing lot, to make such grant of permission retroactive to the date of
the arrest, and to inform the state's prosecuting attorney of the retro-
active permission. The apparent theory of the injunction was that a
district court order providing for retroactive permission would remove
an essential basis for the trespass proceeding, i.e., lack of consent, and
thus end the prosecution. As a legal proposition the theory appears
dubious, and, as discussed below, the approach seems ridiculously in-
direct. After the section 10(j) petition was filed the prosecutor agreed
to defer prosecution until the Board issued its final order on the mer-
its.10 4  The Board then withdrew its petition, finding that the em-
ployee would not suffer the time or expense of a criminal trial prior
to Board adjudication of the case. 1 5
Temporary albeit highly uncertain protection against prosecution
was thus promptly given the employee. One cannot help but marvel,
however, at the absolutely convoluted approach the Board took in the
case. The employee had been arrested and was awaiting trial for
conduct that not only was at the least "arguably subject" t  to sections
7 and 8 of the Act but that was in fact the subject of a pending
Board case. In this situation section 10(j) would appear to give the
Board clear authority directly to seek in federal court to restrain the
state court proceeding on grounds of both the general preemption
doctrine'0 7 and the protection of federal court jurisdiction under see-
Port, Inc., 517 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1975); Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Meter. 385 F.2d 265
(8th Cir. 1967); Angle v. Sacks, 382 F.2d 655 (10th Cir. 1967). See Boire v. Pilot Freight
Carriers, Inc., 515 F.2d 1185 (5th Cir. 1975).
104. NLRB Gen. Counsel Q. Rep., [1977] 96 LAB. REL. REP. [BNA] 1. 9.
105. Id.
106. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 245 (1959). "When an
activity is arguably subject to § 7 or § 8 of the Act, the States as well as the federal courts must
defer to the exclusive competence of the National Labor Relations Foard if the danger of state
interference with national policy is to be averted." Id. at 245. Lodge 76, IAM v, WERC, 427 U.S.
132 (1976); Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S 274 (1971). See
generally Cox, Labor Law Preemption Revisited, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1337 (1972); Come, Federal
Preemption of Labor-Management Relations: Current Problems in the Application of Garmon, 56
VA. L. REV. 1435 (1970).
107. NLRB v. Nash-Finch Co., 404 U.S. 138 (1971); NLRB v. Comm. of Interns & Resi-
dents, 566 F.2d 810 (2d Cir. 1977); NLRB v. New York, 436 F. Supp. 335 (E.D.N.Y. 1977): Tyree
v. Edwards, 287 F. Supp. 589 (D.C. Alas. 1969). See Sears, Roebuck & Co, v. Carpenters. 46
U.S.L.W. 4446, 4453 & n.43 (U.S. May 15, 1978);; Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1944).
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tion 10(j).108 The Board's failure to take direct action when a funda-
mental section 7 right is made the subject of a state criminal prosecu-
tion is most unfortunate. The case cried out for a stronger and more
decisive stand by the NLRB. Employees' exercise of their section 7
rights should not rest on the discretion or mood of state prosecutors
or technicalities of the law of trespass. One is reminded of Mr. Jus-
tice Jackson's admonition that, "Substantive rights and duties in the
field of labor-management do not depend on verbal ritual remini-
scent of medieval real property law." 09
The failure of the NLRB to take a stronger stand is rendered
even more unfortunate in light of the apparent subsequent develop-
ments in the case. In what appears to be the Board decision on the
merits in the foregoing case, the Board found that the employer
had violated section 8(a)(1) by enforcing its nonaccess rule against
the employee and by causing his arrest for distributing literature in
the parking lot."0 The Board ordered the employer to notify the ap-
propriate authorities of the Board decision but rejected the Adminis-
istrative Law Judge's recommended order that would have required
the employer to notify the authorities that the employer was withdraw-
ing a criminal complaint against the employee. The Board stated:
"Inasmuch as the record reveals that the local police, and not Respon-
dent, signed the criminal complaint against [the employee], it is
beyond our remedial power to effect the withdrawal of that com-
plaint.""' Accordingly, as matters now appear to stand, the employee
remains subject to criminal prosecution, at the discretion of the local
prosecutor, for what the Board has found to be a clearly protected
activity. Further, even if the prosecutor elects to drop the case, the
employee retains an arrest record based on protected activity, again
subject to the discretion of the local authorities.112 Something is
very wrong."
3
108. Capital Service, Inc., v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 501 (1954). See Amalgamated Clothing
Workers v. Richman Bros. Co., 348 U.S. 511, 516-17 (1955).
109. NLRB v. Rockaway News Co., 345 U.S. 71, 75 (1953).
110. Chrysler Corp., 232 N.L.R.B. No. 74, 96 L.R.R.M. 1382 (1977). Neither the names of
the parties nor the case numbers appear in the reports of the earlier General Counsel and Board
proceedings; one can only surmise from the similarity of the facts that the cases are identical.
I 11. Id. at 1382.
112. Concerning the serious adverse consequences of arrest records and the prevailing
federal doctrine regarding expungement see Menard v. Mitchell, 430 F.2d 486 (D.C. Cir. 1970);
United States v. Schnitzer, 567 F.2d 536 (2d Cir. 1977), and cases there cited.
113. But see Baptist Memorial Hosp., 229 N.L.R.B. No. 1, 95 L.R.R.M. 1043 (1977) in ,%hich
an employee who refused to stop distributing handbills on the employer's premises %%as arrested
and convicted of disorderly conduct and fined S25. The Board found that the emplo)er main-
tained an unlawful no-access rule in violation of § 8(a)(l). The Board ordered the employer to
make the employee whole for the S25 fine, to pay the legal fees and expenses incurred by the
employee in connection with his arrest and conviction, and to join with the employee in a joint
petition to the local court and police department to expunge any record of arrest and conviction.
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One significant aspect of the foregoing case is that it demon-
strates the Board's use of section 10j) injunctions as a speedy and
effective remedy for the protection of section 7 rights. The increased
use of the section 100) injunction by the General Counsel and Board
should not go unnoted. In 1954, for example, only six section 100)
proceedings were instituted." 4  In 1976 twenty section 10() proceed-
ings were instituted in district court. 115  Between July 1, 1976 and
July 1, 1977 the General Counsel's Division of Advice processed 219
requests for section 10() relief, and during this period the Board
authorized the General Counsel to seek section 10(j) injunctions in 51
cases. 116
Section 10() injunctive relief is an appropriate and highly effec-
tive remedy in a variety of unfair labor practice situations." 7 Preser-
vation and restoration of the status quo can be crucial for realistic
protection of section 7 rights when there is reasonable fear that the
efficacy of the Board's final order may otherwise be nullified, or that
the Board's administrative procedures may be rendered meaning-
less. 18 The outcry of the day, justifiably, is for increased use of sec-
tion 10() injunctions against employers who flagrantly and repeatedly
violate the Act. 119 The pendulum swings, however, and tomorrow
the cry may be against employee concerted activities which offend
particular, dominant employer interests.
The fact that the section 10(j) proceeding is instituted and con-
trolled by the Board, rather than by private parties, 20 goes a long
way toward guarding against abuses which have historically marked
the labor injunction.' 2 ' The labor injunction nevertheless remains a
powerful weapon for resolving labor disputes prematurely and for
curtailing the free exercise of fundamental rights; private parties can
114. 19 NLRB ANN. REP. 175 (1954).
115. 41 NLRB ANN. REP. 255 (1976).
116. NLRB, REPORT ON THE OPERATION OF THE OFFICE OF TiE GENERAL COUNSEL, [1977]
96 LAB. REL. REP. [BNA] 333, 335.
117. For examples of the various situations in which § 10(j) relief was sought during 1977
see NLRB Gen. Counsel Q. Reps., [1977] 96 LAB. REL. REP. [BNA] 1, 9, 173, 175; 95 [1977] LAB,
REL. REP. [BNA] 110, 115; [1977] 94 LAB. REL. REP. [BNA] 175, 177.
118. Eg., Hendrix v. Meat Cutters, Local 340, 555 F.2d 175 (8th Cir. 1977); Squillacote v.
Local 248, Food Workers, 534 F.2d 735, 744 (7th Cir. 1976).
119. See generally Siegel, Section 10") of the National Labor Relations Act: Suggested
Reform for an Expanded Use, 13 B.C. IND & COMM. L. REV. 457 (1972); Note, 44 N.Y.U.L, RLv.
181 (1969).
120. Bakery Sales Drivers, Local 33 v. Wagshal, 333 U.S. 437, 442 (1948),
121. F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION (1930); C. GREGORY, LABOR
AND THE LAW I-VII (2d rev. ed. 1958); C. SUMMERS & H. WELLINGTON, CASE S AND MAT-
ERIALS ON LABOR LAW 163-68 (1968); Winter, Labor Injunctions and Judge-made Labor Law:
The Contemporary Role of Norris-LaGuardia, 70 YALE L.J. 70, 71-76 (1960). See Butlalo
Forge Co. v. Steelworkers, 428 U.S. 397 (1976); Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 414 U.S. 368 (1974);
Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970); Marine Cooks v. Panama S.S.
Co., 362 U.S. 365 (1960); United States v. UMW, 330 U.S. 258 (1947); United States v.
Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1940); New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co,, 303 U.S. 552 (1938).
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be expected to put substantial pressure on the Board to seek injunc-
tions in various situations. To the extent that the injunction neces-
sarily prejudges the ultimate legality of given activity it can be unfair
or unjustified. Too much regulation too soon can improperly deny
employee, union or employer of legitimate statutory rights. It should
be remembered that "the use of economic pressure by the parties
to a labor dispute is not a grudging exception to some policy of com-
pletely academic discussion enjoined by the Act; it is part and parcel
of the process of collective bargaining."'' 22  The federal regulatory
scheme leaves some activities and practices "to be controlled by the
free play of economic forces."123  Restraint and judgment are re-
quired to preclude government by injunction from becoming the next
national labor policy.
C. Shopping Mall Picketing
Board protection for the section 7 rights of employees freely to
communicate their positions in labor disputes to other employees
and to the public at shopping mall locations was given substantial
affirmation in the remand decision in Scott Hudgens.124 In Hudgens
warehouse employees of a retail shoe employer struck to protest the
employer's failure to agree to their union's contract negotiation de-
mands. The strikers picketed not only the employer's warehouse but
also one of the employer's retail stores located within a large, enclosed
shopping mall which houses sixty various retail stores. The employees
picketed in an area of the mall immediately adjacent to the employ-
er's retail shoe store. The owner of the mall told the pickets that
they could not picket within the mall or in the parking lot and threatened
to have them arrested for trespassing if they did not leave. The Board
found that the owner's arrest threat violated section 8(a)(1). In the
Supreme Court's view the Board's finding rested in part upon in-
valid first amendment notions, namely, a constitutional right of ac-
cess to private property such as shopping centers that might be classi-
fied as quasi-public. 125  The Supreme Court remanded the case to the
122. NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Union, 361 U.S. 477, 495 (1960).
123. NLRB v. Nash-Finch Co., 404 U.S. 138, 144 (1971). In Nash-Finch, the Court noted.
but did not consider itself restricted by Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). See Lodge 76:
IAM v. WERC, 427 U.S. 132, 140 (1976); Garner v. Teamsters Local 776, 346 U.S. 485, 500 (1953).
124. 230 N.L.R.B. No. 73, 95 L.R.R.M. 1351 (1977), supplementing 192 N.LR.B. 671 (1971)
and 205 N.L.R.B. 628 (1973). Accord, Yurosek & Son, 229 N.L.R.B. No. 21, 95 L.R.R.M. 1382
(1977).
125. Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976). The Court made clear its rejection of the
principles of Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308. 319- 20 (1968),
in which the Court per Mr. Justice Marshall had stated:
[b]ecause the shopping center serves as the community business block "and is freely
accessible and open to the people in the area and those passing through," Marsh %,. Ala-
bama, 326 U.S. at 508, the State may not delegate power, through the use of its trespass
law, wholly to exclude those members of the public wishing to exercise their First Amend-
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Board to evaluate the legitimacy of the picketing solely under the
statutory criteria of section 7. The Court, relying upon its earlier
section 7 analyses in NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co. 26 and Central
Hardware Co. v. NLRB2 7 stated that the Board's task was to seek
an accommodation between the employees' section 7 rights and the
employer's property rights "with as little destruction of one as is con-
sistent with the maintenance of the other."'
' 28
On remand in Scott Hudgens the Board applied the Babcock &
Wilcox balancing test and found that the shopping mall owner's prop-
erty rights must yield to the employees' section 7 rights. The Board
found that the fact that the case involved economic strike activity
rather than organizational activity made little difference, and that the
economic pick9ting was entitled to the same measure of protection
as had been afforded the organizational activity in Babcock & Wil-
cox. 129  The Board also found irrelevant the fact that the picketers were
employees of the retail shoe company whose store they were picketing
rather than nonemployees as had been the union organizers in Bab-
cock & Wilcox. The Board stated:
[I]t is basic that Section 7 of the Act was intended to protect the rights
of employees rather than those of non-employees. With this principle
in mind, the employee status of the pickets here entitled them to at
least as much protection as would be afforded the non-employee or-
ganizers such as those in Babcock & Wilcox. 3"
ment rights on the premises in a manner and for a purpose generally consonant with the
use to which the property is actually put.
See Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
126. 351 U.S. 105 (1956). The Court there held that "an employer may validly post his
property against nonemployee distribution of union literature if reasonable efforts by the union
through other available channels of communication will enable it to reach the employees with its
message and if the employer's notice or order does not discriminate tgainst the union by allowing
other distribution." Id. at 112. See generally Hanley, Union Orgenization on Company Prop-
erty-A Discussion of Property Rights, 47 GEo. L.J. 266 (1958); Gould, The Question of Union
Activity on Company Property, 18 VAND. L. REV. 73 (1964).
127. 407 U.S. 539 (1972).
128. 424 U.S. at 507, quoting NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 112 (1956).
The Court said in Hudgens:
[t]he locus of that accommodation, however, may fall at differing points along the spec-
trum depending on the nature and strength of the respective § 7 rights and private prop-
erty rights asserted in any given context. In each generic situation, the primary respon-
sibility for making this accommodation must rest with the Board in the first instance.
424 U.S. at 522. See Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 46 U.S.L.W. 4765 (U.S. June 22, 1978),
129. The Board's concern for protection of § 7 rights of speech is also highlighted by the
Board's continued refusal to permit broad restrictions on those rights even in a hospital environ-
ment. E.g., Florida Medical Center, Inc., 227 N.L.R.B. No. 198, 94 L.R.R.M. 1419 (1977), Pres-
byterian Medical Center, 227 N.L.R.B. No. 135, 94 L.R.R.M. 1695 (1977); Beth Israel Hosp.,
223 N.L.R.B. 1193 (1976), aff'd, 46 U.S.L.W. 4764 (U.S. June 22, 1978); St. John's Hosp. & Sch.
of Nursing, Inc., 222 N.L.R.B. 1150, 91 L.R.R.M. 1333 (1976), enforcement denied, 557 F.2d
1368 (10th Cir. 1977). See Times Publishing Co., 231 N.L.R.B. No. 44, 96 L.R.R.M. 1059 (1977)
(lobby of business office); McBride's of Naylor Road, 229 N.L.R.B. No. 120, 95 L.R.R.M. 1196
(1977) (retail stores). See also Baptist Memorial Hosp., 229 N.L.R.B. No, 1, 95 L.R.R.M. 1043
(1977), and cases there cited.
130. 95 L.R.R.M. at 1353.
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The Board found further that the shopping mall owner's prop-
erty right to exclude certain types of activity on his mall must yield
to the section 7 rights of the employees to engage in economic activ-
ity directed against their own employer who did business at the mall.,
In the Board's view, it was thereby merely subjecting shopping mall
enterprises to the same risks already endured by similar enterprises
which front on public sidewalks. The Board stated:
It is clear, then, that by our holding here we do no more than assure
that employees of employers doing business in such malls will be af-
forded the full protection of the Act. In our view, the national labor
policy requires the such employees be afforded that protection. A con-
trary holding would enable employers to insulate themselves from Sec-
tion 7 activities by simply moving their operations to leased locations
on private malls, and would thereby render Section 7 meaningless as to
their employees.
32
The Board rejects any notion that primary, economic strikers
have less rights under section 7 than do nonemployee union organ-
izers. 33  A contrary result would indeed be anomalous. The thres-
hold interest of employees in learning of the merits of unionization
hardly outweighs their interest in promoting their bargaining de-
mands.134  Nor is the fact that the primary employer is located upon
the property of another person sufficient reason to prohibit the picket-
ing. The concept of legal title should not, be determinative of the
breadth to be accorded section 7 rights nor should it be allowed to
shelter the primary employer from the legitimate pressures of the
employees. 35  Nor should the fact that the employer shares common
131. The General Counsel recently took the position that employer threats or coercive state-
ments are not requisites to finding a violation, and that an employer violated § 8(aXl) merely by
refusing employees the right to picket near the primary employer's store in a shopping center.
NLRB Gen. Counsel Q. Rep., [1977] 96 LAa. RE.L. REP. [BNA] 141, 141-42. In the General
Counsel's view, "an employer violates the Act by withholding his consent to the entry on his
property, thereby failing and refusing to accommodate his property rights to the Section 7 rights
of his employees. Id. at 142.
132. 95 L.R.R.M. at 1355.
133. See Curtis v. Rosso & Mastracco, Inc., 413 F. Supp. 804, 94 L.R.R.M. 2178 (E.D. Va.
1976) where the court relied upon Hudgens in holding that a supermarket's instigation of the
arrest and prosecution of a non-employee union organizer for trespass was not unconstitutional
government action within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970).
134. Section 13 of the Act reflects Congress' general solicitude for economic strike activity.
Section 13 provides: "Nothing in this subchapter, except as specifically provided for herein, shall
be construed so as either to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike, or
to affect the limitations or qualifications on that right." 29 U.S.C. § 163 (1970). NLRB v. Drivers
Local 639, 362 U.S. 274, 282 (1960); NLRB v. Int'l Rice Milling Co., 341 U.S. 665, 672-73 (1951);
UAW v. O'Brien, 339 U.S. 454, 456-57 (1950). "This repeated solicitude for the right to strike
is predicated upon the conclusion that a strike when legitimately employed is an economic Meap-
on which in great measure implements and supports the principles of the collective bargaining
system," NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 233-34 (1963).
135. In Steelworkers v. NLRB, 376 U.S. 492, 499 (1964) the Court noted that "the picketed
gate in the present case was located on property owned by New York Central Railroad and not
upon property owned by the primary employer. The location of the picketing is an important but
not decisive factor, and in this case . . . has little, if any, significance." See Linbeck Constr.
Corp. v. NLRB, 550 F.2d 311 (5th Cir. 1977).
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premises with other retail employers in a shopping mall restrict picketing
that is limited to the area immediately adjacent to the primary em-
ployer. 136  Adequate safeguards exist under section 8(b)(4) 37 to limit
the scope of the picketing to preclude any unwarranted enmeshing
of the neutral employers in the primary dispute. IN:
D. Right to Confer with Union Representative
The expansive reading given by the Board in Scott Hudgens
to section 7's protection of concerted activities was further reflected
in several other cases briefly noted here. These cases involved ques-
tions concerning the rights of employees to confer with their chosen
union representative and the treatment of individual employee action
as concerted activity for the benefit of other employees.
In Climax Molybdenum Co., 39 the Board found that the employer
had violated section 8(a)(1) of the Act by refusing to allow a union
representative to consult with two employees prior to an investiga-
tory interview which the employees reasonably believed could result
in disciplinary action. Two miners involved in an altercation were
advised by their supervisor that the matter would be dealt with the
following morning. In the morning one miner was advised by the
union shop steward that there would be an investigation and that
both of the miners could be fired. The same morning the union's
grievance representative was summoned by a foreman to the employ-
er's office at 7:30 a.m. for the investigation. 140 Before the investiga-
tion began, the grievance representative asked the foreman if he
and the shop steward could speak with the two miners. The foreman
denied the request and stated that the union representatives could
speak with the miners during the course of the investigation. The
meeting resulted in oral warnings to the two miners.
136. Local 222, Newspaper Guild (Miami Herald Publishing Co), 218 N.L.R.B. 1234 (1975);
Local 25, NABET (Taft Broacasting Co.), 194 N.L.R.B. 162 (1971); Steelworkers Local 6991
(Auburndale Freezer Corp.), 177 N.L.R.B. 791 (1969), vacated, 434 F.2d 1219 (5th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 402 U.S. 1013 (1971). The fact that the primary employer had another location where
the employees could picket, i.e., the warehouse, did not render unlawful the picketing at the
employer's shopping mall store. IBEW Local 861 (Plauche Elec., Inc.), 135 N.L.R.B. 250 (1962).
137. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1970).
138. Local 761, IUE v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 667 (1961); Building & Constr. Trades Council
(Markwell & Hartz, Inc.), 155 N.L.R.B. 319 (1965), enforced, 387 F.2d 79 (5th Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 391 U.S. 914 (1968). See SEIU Local 105, (Indus. Janitorial Serv. Inc.), 151 N.L.R.B.
1424 (1965); Local 254, SEIU (Univ. Cleaning Co.), 151 N.L.R.B. 341 (1965), See gencrally
Lesnick, The Gravamen of the Secondary Boycott, 62 COLLM. L. RLV. 1363 (1962); Goetz,
Secondary Boycotts and the LMRA: A Path Through the Swamp, 19 KAN. L. REv. 561 (1971),
139. 227 N.L.R.B. No. 154, 94 L.R.R.M. 1177 (1977) (Chairmar, Murphy and Member Jen-
kins for the majority, with Member Fanning concurring and Members Pencil and Walther
dissenting).
140. The collective bargaining agreement provided for the presence of union representation
whenever an employee was subject to action which might affect his permanent record or result
in disciplinary action or discharge.
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The Board found the denial of prior consultation violative of sec-
tion 8(a)(1). In the Board's view, an employee's right to representa-
tion at an investigatory-disciplinary interview includes the right of
the employee to confer with the union representative prior to the
interview. To effectively represent the employee in an investigation,
said the Board, the union representative must be knowledgeable con-
cerning the matter under investigation, and these objectives can best
be achieved where the union representative has a prior opportunity to
learn the facts of the matter from the employee involved. The Board
stated:
Nothing in the rationale of Weingarten 1 41] suggests that, in its endorse-
ment. of the role of a "knowledgeable union representative," the Su-
preme Court meant to put blinders on the union representative by deny-
ing him the opportunity of learning the facts by consultation with the
employee prior to the investigatory-disciplinary interview. Knowledge-
ability implies the very opposite. The right to representation clearly
embraces the right to prior consultation.
142
In Weingarten143 and in ILGWU v. Quality Mfg. Co. 44 the Su-
preme Court upheld the Board's position that an employee has a
section 7 right to have a union representative present at an investi-
gatory interview which the employee reasonably believes will result
in disciplinary action. 45  The Court found that the employee's repre-
sentational right constituted "concerted" activity for "mutual aid or
protection" because the union representative safeguards not only the
particular employee but also the interests of the entire bargaining
unit against unjust discipline.146
The Board's expansive reading in Climax of the statutory phrase
"concerted activities" appears reasonable. 47  The essential predi-
cate for the representational right recognized in Weingarten is that
a "knowledgeable" union representative can assist both employee and
employer by helping to ascertain the significant facts. Prior consul-
tation clearly furthers that goal. The presence of a prepared and
141. NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251 (1975).
142. 94 L.R.R.M. at 1178.
143. 420 U.S. 251 (1975).
144. 420 U.S. 276 (1975).
145. The development of the Board's doctrine can be traced in such cases as Chevron Oil
Co., 168 N.L.R.B. 574 (1967); Texaco, Inc., 168 N.L.RLB. 361 (1967). enforcement denied, 408
F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 1969); Jacobe-Pearson Ford, 172 N.L.R.B. 594 (1968); Quality Mfg. Co., 195
N.L.R.B. 195 (1972), afl'd, 420 U.S. 276 (1975); Mobile Oil Co., 196 N.L.B. 1052 (1972); Mt.
Vernon Tanker Co., 218 N.L.R.B. 1423 (1975), enforcement denied, 549 F.2d 571 (9th Cir. 1977).
See generally Comment, Union Presence in Disciplinary Meetings, 41 U. Citi. L REv. 329 (1974).
146. The Court held that an employer violates § 8(aXl) if it denies a representational request,
if it discharges or disciplines an employee for refusing to participate in an interview without a
representative, or if it discharges or disciplines either employee or union representative for re-
questing representation.
147. Accord, Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 227 N.L.R.B. No. 175, 94 LR.R.M. 1305 (1977);
Certified Grocers, 227 N.L.R.B. No. 52, 94 L.RL.M. 1279 (1977).
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informed union representative need not transform the interview into
an adversary proceeding. The union's role is confined to advisor
and assistant in the fact-finding process, and the employer has no
mandatory duty to bargain with the union at the interview. The
employee's representational right is grounded in section 7, not section
8(a)(5). Nor does the presence of a prepared union representative
constitute further intrusion upon the employer's legitimate preroga-
tives concerning the interview. 48  The employer remains free to deny
the representational request without need for justification and to pro-
ceed without the employee interview. 49  The presence of a knowl-
edgeable union representative at the interview eliminates to a sig-
nificant degree the inequality of bargaining power between employee
and employer. National labor policy favors that emerging equal-
ity.15
0
E. Individual Action For The Common Good
The Board's broadening grant of hospitable scope to the section
7 concept of concerted activity is further reflected in a number of
cases in which ostensibly single employee complaints or protests
are treated as concerted.
In Jim Causley Pontiac,'15 for example, the employee had com-
plained to the employer about paint fumes and a telephone buzzer
in his work area but received no response. Other employees had
complained about the paint fumes, but not the buzzer. The employee
then contacted the Michigan Occupational Safety and Health Admin-
istration about the problems. The day the state inspector arrived at
the employer's facility the employer laid off the employee. The Board
found that the layoff violated section 8(a)(1). The basic rationale for
the Board's conclusion is that the filing of such a complaint by an
individual employee is protected concerted activity because the mat-
ter relates to the enforcement of health and safety laws which benefit
148. The Board's decision in Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 227 N.L.R.B. No. 173, 94 L.RR.M,
1200 (1977), reflects the Board's concern with legitimate employer rights. The Board there held
that the employer did not violate § 8(a)(l) and (5) of the Act (29 U.S C. §§ 158 (a)(1), (5) (1970))
by refusing to postpone an investigatory-disciplinary interview when the particular union repre-
sentative requested by the employee was not available. The employee did not ask for an alternate
union representative, and the Board found that the employer had no Dbligation either to suggest
or to secure an alternate representative. The Board stated, "(T]he Supreme Court [in Weingar-
ten] was careful to point out that the exercise by employees of the right to representation at an
interview may not interfere with legitimate employer prerogatives. Certainly the right to hold
interviews of this type without delay is a legitimate employer prerogative," 94 L.R.R.M. at 1201.
149. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., Case No. 1-CA-12879, 95 L.R.R.M. 1530 (1977) (General
Counsel Advise Case).
150. NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 260-61 (1975). '[A] primary purpose of the
National Labor Relations Act was to redress the perceived imbalance of economic power between
labor and management .... " American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 316 (1965),
151. 232 N.L.R.B. No. 37 (1977). Accord, B & P Motor Exprcss, Inc., 230 N,L.R.1, No.
96, 95 L.R.R.M. 1438 (1977).
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all employees. The rationale, as recently articulated in Alleluia
Cushion Co.,152 rests upon a doctrine of implied consent. The
legislature has enacted minimum health and safety -laws for the pro-
tection and benefit of all employees, and consent and concert of
action arise from the mere assertion of such statutory rights. No
outward manifestation of support by fellow employees is required.
Therefore when an employee seeks to enforce statutory provisions
related to occupational health and safety the activity will be deemed
concerted absent evidence that fellow employees have disavowed
such representation. 153
In Dawson Cabinet Co., Inc.,154 the Board reached the same
conclusion when the employee's protest that the employer did not pay
males and fenales equally was regarded as concerted activity in at-
tempted vindication of the female employees' rights under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In contrast, however, in its earlier
decision in Hunt Tool Co.,' s the Board held that the filing of an
individual claim under the Jones Act and/or the Longshoremen's and
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act was not protected concerted
activity. The Board apparently regarded the employee's claim as too
personalized or individualized to be deemed concerted. The viability
of Hunt Tool in light of the developing line of Board cases in this
area seems dubious.15 6  The rationale of Alleluia Cushion would
seem properly to apply whenever an employee seeks to enforce social
or protective labor legislation. There is little of substance to com-
mend attempts to make any kind of meaningful distinction between
degrees of employees' common interests and concern on the basis of
the particular type of protective law being enforced-that is, between
workmens' compensation laws and safety laws. The concept of
"uniquely personal rights" in the context of the employment relation-
152. 221 N.L.R.B. 999 (1975). The Board there held that the filing by an individual cm-
ployee of a complaint with OSHA was protected concerted activity. See generally Eastx, Inc.
v. NLRB, 46 U.S.L.W. 4783, 4786 nd (U.S. June 22, 1978).
153. Individual action designed to present common grievances or to invoke or support
group action is also deemed protected concerted activity. /g.. NLRB v. Empire Gas, Inc.,
566 F.2d 681 (10th Cir. 1977); NLRB v. Brown, 546 F.2d 690 (6th Cir. 1976); Hugh H. Wilson
Corp. v. NLRB, 414 F.2d 1345, 1347-1350 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 935 (1970). and
cases there cited; Garfield Park Health Center, 232 N.L.R.B. No. 163, 96 L.R.R.M. 1481 (1977);
Fairmont Hotel Co., 230 N.L.R.B. No. 126, 96 L.R.R.M. 1031 (1977); Ambulance Sen ices, 229
N.L.R.B. No. 3, 95 L.R.R.M. 1239 (1977) (filing criminal complaint against employer for bounced
paycheck). See also NLRB v. Waco Insulation, Inc., 567 F.2d 596 (4th Cir. 1977).
154. 228 N.L.R.B. No. 47, 96 L.R.R.M. 1373 (1977), enforcement denied 566 F.2d 1079
(8th Cir. 1977).
155. 192 N.L.R.B. 145 (1971).
156. !Eg., Triangle Tool & Eng'r, Inc., 226 N.L.R.B. No. 205,94 LR.R.M. 1108 (1976), in
which an employee's complaint to the Wage and Hour Division of the U.S. Department of Labor
was deemed concerted activity. See King Soopers, Inc. 222 N.L.R.B. 1011 (1976), holding pro-
tected the individual filing of charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and a
state Fair Employment Practices agency.
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ship has been rejected by the Supreme Court under section 301 of
the Act and should be rejected under section 7 as well.1
57
A broad reading of section 7 analogous to the foregoing concept
of statutory enforcement is also reflected in cases such as Firch Bak-
ing Co.,' 58 holding that individual action to enforce contract terms is
protected concerted activity. In Firch, for example, an employee com-
plained to the employer concerning overtime, shift changes and safety
conditions. The contract contained provisions covering overtime and
safety conditions. The employer suspended the employee. The Board
found the suspension violative of section 8(a)(1) because the employee's
criticisms were protected concerted activity, namely, an effort to im-
plement the terms of the collective bargaining agreement." 9 The
Board regards the individual's enforcement of the contract not only as
redounding to the benefit of all the employees but also as merely
extending the concerted activity which led to and culminated in the
contract.
160
CONCLUSION
Section 7 is the heart of the NLRA. The rights that it guarantees
to employees to engage in organization, unionization, collective bar-
gaining and other concerted activities are of supreme importance un-
der our national scheme of labor-management relations. These rights
embody vital and fundamental concepts of freedom of choice and
157. Section 301 of the Act provides that suits for violation of contracts between employcrs
and unions may be brought in federal court. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills. 353 U.S.
448 (1957). In Ass'n of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Corp., 348 U.S, 437
(1955), the Court held that federal courts lacked jurisdiction under § 301 over union actions to
recover employees' accrued wage claims. The Court regarded such claims as uniquely personal
to the individual employee. The Westinghouse doctrine was later 3quarely rejected in Smith v.
Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195, 200 (1962), where the Court stated:
The concept that all suits to vindicate individual employee rights arising from a collective
bargaining contract should be excluded from the coverage of § 301 has thus not survived.
The rights of individual employees concerning rates of pay and c ,nditions of employment
are a major focus on the negotiation and administration of collective bargaining contracts.
Individual claims lie at the heart of the grievance and arbitration machinery, arc to a large
degree inevitably intertwined with union interests and many timcs precipitate grave ques-
tions concerning the interpretation and enforceability of the collective bargaining con-
tract on -which they are based. To exclude these claims from the ambit of § 301 would
stultify the congressional policy of having the administration of collective bargaining con-
tracts accomplished under a uniform body of federal substantive law. This we are unwill-
ing to do.
See UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696 (1966).
158. 232 N.L.R.B. No. 120 (1977). Accord, Meade Constr. Co., Inc., 220 N.L.R.B. 691
(1976), enforcement denied, 555 F.2d 1348 (6th Cir. 1977).
159. Accord, Aro Inc., 227 N.L.R.B. No. 43, 94 L.R.R.M. 1010 (1976); Roadway Express,
Inc., 209 N.L.R.B. 278 (1975), enforced 532 F.2d 751 (4th Cir. 1976); NLRB v. Century Broad-
casting Corp., 419 F.2d 771, 780 (8th Cir. 1969); Interboro Contractors, Inc., 157 N.L.RB. 1295
(1966), enforced, 388 F.2d 495 (2d Cir. 1967); Bunney Bros. Constr. Co., 139 N.L.R.B, 1516,
1519 (1962). Contra NLRB v. Northern Metal Co., 440 F.2d 881 (3d Cir. 1971).
160. See generally Comment, Constructive Concerted Activity end Individual Rights: The
Northern Metal-Interboro Split, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 152 (1972).
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speech. The recent cases and related developments discussed in this
article indicate that the NLRB, both Board and General Counsel, are
becoming increasingly sensitive to the significance of these funda-
mental section 7 rights. The direction of the NLRB clearly seems to
be toward a permissive rather than a restrictive interpretation of the
concepts of free choice and speech. Equally apparent is the NLRB fo-
cus upon meaningful remedies to make the free exercise of section 7
rights reality and not futility.
